La Electoral law it is a fundamental piece of the more general reorganization of our institutional system which the country urgently needs. These are complex rules whose implications are often not immediately perceivable, and furthermore the debate that immediately unleashes on a proposal is almost always tainted by prejudices or by the business interests of this or that political group, which have nothing to do with Italy's problems. So allow a "non" expert to make some observations in order to stimulate a debate on a precise assessment of what has been proposed, and which perhaps can also be useful to parliamentarians who are preparing to examine the bill.
I must say right away that my personal assessments start from the assumption that in this phase, Italy needs a system that allows for government stability because the reforms that need to be made require at least four or five years of operation to be able to produce any effect and then be evaluated. Of course I'm not naïve enough to think that the electoral system alone can solve all the problems of the lack of incisiveness of our politics, but it certainly represents an important step in the more general institutional reorganization.
The main criticisms that have so far been leveled at theitalicum they concern, on the one hand, the non-introduction of preferences, and on the other, the system of the majority bonus and the various thresholds envisaged. Even the functioning of the possible double shift seems to arouse much criticism among constitutionalists.
With regard to preferences it seems to me that their introduction, claimed by the minority of the Democratic Party and by Alfano, is somewhat instrumental. In reality, preferences lead to an increase in the costs of politics and during the First Republic they gave rise to serious distortions. Small constituencies can equally create a closer link between voters and those elected, and should push parties (with or without primaries) to choose candidates known and esteemed in the area and perhaps able to draw from a transversal electorate. And this without falling into exaggerated localism which is certainly not a good thing for those who are called upon to deal with national problems, moreover by framing them in an international context. Not having foreseen preferences therefore does not seem to be a great vulnus to democracy.
More complex is the problem of the thresholds for obtaining the majority bonus and for access to Parliament for small parties. A minimum coalition threshold of 35% is envisaged for the majority premium. Is it too low? Furthermore, for minor parties forming part of a coalition there is a threshold of 5% to participate in the distribution of seats. So if, for example, coalition X were to obtain 35% with the main party at 25% and the other coalition parties at 10% none of which, however, above the 5% threshold, then the coalition bonus of 18% would be assigned only to main party which in reality only obtained 25% of the votes, however winning 53% of the seats. And this is certainly a first problem. And indeed what seems fundamental to me, not so much because I care about the fate of small parties, but because the system actually appears a bit unbalanced. Above all in the event that one or two minor parties exceed the 5% threshold (with the aggravating circumstance of the safeguard clause for local parties, namely the League), disputed and inconclusive parliamentary majorities such as those that characterized the twenty years of the Second Republic.
On the other hand, the objection of those who, if it were to go to the ballot in the event that no coalition had reached 35% in the first round, seems completely inconsistent, who are alarmed because a party would reach an absolute majority of seats even starting from a very low number of votes in the first round. But this objection does not take into account that the second round is an election as democratic as that of the first round, in which the voters would be induced to choose the least worst, as happened in France when Le Pen went to the ballot.
The heart of the problem of both governability and representation therefore lies in the 35% threshold and in the barrier for minor parties. A series of proposals are already being put forward ranging from the unbundling of the votes of the parties that do not reach the 5% threshold from the coalition, to the lowering of this threshold to the current 2%, or other ways to involve even small parties the division of seats in the majority premium. These are proposals that would distort the entire structure of the proposal with respect to the need to ensure the identification of a certain winner of the elections.
Perhaps it would be better to change by deleting the coalitions from the first round, and making sure that each party presents itself with its own symbol, but maintaining a minimum threshold of 5%, which is high, but no different from that existing in other European countries. After that, if a single party exceeds the 35% threshold, then it takes the majority prize and governs for five years without undergoing the blackmail of smaller formations always looking for visibility. And this in itself would constitute a strong incentive for voters to concentrate their votes towards the major formations. In the event that no party reaches the 35% threshold, the two major formations would have to go to the second round. Whoever wins would have 53% of the seats, but the others would be repaid proportionally among all the formations that in the first round will have exceeded 5%.
A simple solution that ensures smaller parties the right to the grandstand, but aims at better governance than that which has been achieved in the recent past with coalitions which have always seen the detachment of some more or less large piece.
We are well aware that it is time to impress on our political-institutional system a "historic" turning point. So let's open a debate by inviting experts and non-experts to intervene, avoiding however the political jargon, but trying to stay on the best solutions to get Italy out of the quagmire it has been in for at least three decades.
