Among the innovations that the government is introducing in the activity of public bodies, there are also regulations concerning the regulatory, competition and Consob authorities, in a broader framework of rationalization of the activity of the independent authorities. Decree Law 90 of 24 June, currently in conversion, suppressed the Public Contracts Authority, bringing it under the Anti-corruption Guarantor. It also introduced with the art. 22 of the Decree, rules which should, once converted into law, lead to a rationalization of the system.
In reality the art. 22 does not seem to concern general issues, but rather some provisions aimed at limiting costs and containing certain distortions. Everything OK? No, because some of the predictions are likely to affect the functionality and effectiveness of at least some of these organisms, and precisely among those that seem to have deserved the most.
In fact, while the experience of the Authorities certainly presents shadows, in particular as regards the assigned purposes, the very need of the bodies and the criteria with which their top management has sometimes been designated, nevertheless some of these bodies have a character of absolute excellence in the field of administrations and have demonstrated great professionalism and independence from politics (albeit subject to cycles linked to the succession of top management). Furthermore, some have become part of a European architecture of control (antitrust) and market regulation which, beyond national rules, explicitly or implicitly presupposes their total independence from the government. So much so that recently the Italian Parliament had to amend a law which limited the autonomy of the Communications Authority, following the risk of an infringement proceeding. It is good then that the interventions do not undermine these characteristics of excellence and independence. It is not entirely clear that this is the case.
Let's start with the positive points contained in the art. 22 The possibility for members of the Authorities to pass from one position to another is limited, imposing a two-year break. Well, even if it is not clear whether the interval of two years is actually sufficient to limit the phenomenon of "professionals" of the Authorities..
A 20 percent reduction is imposed in the ancillary economic treatment of employees and a 50 percent reduction in expenses for consultancy, study and research assignments. In the general climate of reduced public spending, this is understandable. Although the Judiciary and the Bank of Italy would probably consider an attempt on their independence a diktat which substantially does not consider the purpose and the workloads to which those ancillary expenses (substantially, missions and overtime) and consultancy expenses (for example, evolution of IT systems) correspond.
The independent administrations are required to submit to the discipline of purchases managed by Consip; to pool general services, from administration to personnel to IT services, with at least one other Authority, in order to obtain significant cost savings; to jointly manage the competitions from an administrative point of view: requests that are not unreasonable, provided that ways are identified to satisfy the specific needs, in particular as regards the selection of the skills necessary for organizations with such different purposes.
But alongside these, all in all, modest rationalization proposals, there are others whose scope can be very harmful. In the first place, the provision of the "Authority Buildings", which would be obtained by grouping the Authorities into two groups, which would then have to find accommodation in contiguous buildings identified by the State Property Agency. Basically two blocks of a thousand people each, to be placed somewhere in Rome. If the goal is to save on the rents of those Authorities that do not have their own headquarters, the use of state-owned buildings is certainly a good idea, which perhaps would not have needed a law to be implemented, but only a decree from the director of the Agency. But why the unification of those that already have a site, with imaginable problems of relocation? The problem then arises in a crucial way for the Authorities that are not based in Rome, in particular that of Energy, which unlike the Communications Authority does not have an important Roman operational headquarters, and unlike that of Transport, recently established , has been in Milan for seventeen years. Here it is a question of transferring not only desks and equipment, but people who have objectively made this Authority one of the most efficient on the European scene: with the risk of dispersing a wealth of skills without particular economic benefits. The question also has more systemic aspects: it is not necessarily desirable for the independent Authorities to be based where the political decision-maker is based. So much so that in Germany, for example, the Competition Authority and those of regulation in a city other than the capital Berlin. Forcing an Authority to change headquarters with effect on its efficiency frankly seems an unjustifiable interference in its activity.
The second problematic point is represented by the extension to the managers of the regulatory authorities and Consob of the incompatibility provisions already envisaged for the members of the board: they will not be able to entertain, directly or indirectly, consultancy or employment relationships with regulated parties for a period of four years. On the surface, it seems the triumph of transparency and independence However, further reflection suggests that the experience relating to the members has not been positive, resulting in a limitation of the figures potentially suitable for the role, restricted to bureaucrats, magistrates and professors, and encouraging the "rotation" in positions. As far as executives are concerned, barriers to exit risk giving rise to barriers to entry: the anticipation of not being able to carry out other activities in the sector in which so much of one's human capital has been invested will end up discouraging the most brilliant executives of the Authority from becoming executives, instead incentivizing them to look for work elsewhere. Thus, there is the risk of creating a new kind of "serfdom", prodromal to an impoverishment and bureaucratization of the institutions. Also because of course the forecast is intended to reduce the outgoing mobility of managers. Nor are the reasons clearly visible: the circulation of talents that has so far occurred between the Authorities and the outside world has allowed the diffusion of a culture of competition and regulation and facilitated dialogue between the world of the economy and the institutions. Of course, the discussion is more general, and concerns the prevailing attitude in our country regarding the relationship between the administration and the outside world. In the Anglo-Saxon world and in the European institutions, the transfer of professionalism from the public to the private sector, and vice versa, is considered beneficial for enriching the public sector with skills and for spreading a public culture and ethics in the private sector: in the belief that an effective of internal control can reduce any risk of behavioral deviation.
In our country a very suspicious view of the relationship between private and public prevails, which has resulted in the separation, and often the detachment of the administration from the realities of the economy and society. The provision in the Decree further aggravates the situation, precisely with respect to institutions that have successfully represented an example that we should instead follow, if we actually want to "change towards" in the relationship between administration and the world of economy.
In essence, the measures of the decree seem harmless or at best annoying: and instead the risk that some of them end up affecting some of the more positive characteristics of the activity of the Authorities is not small: it would be good if the conversion process led to a fix.
