Can a country of 10 million inhabitants, with a GDP that represents just over 2 percent of the wealth of the monetary union and a debt equal to less than 4 percent of the total stock, put the whole of Europe in crisis for the second time ? Maybe not. And not just because, compared to 2011, Europe has equipped itself with tools that work and the risk of contagion has significantly reduced thanks to the strengthening of peripheral economies. But also because the probable future Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, doesn't seem so scary. At least not in Berlin. The Syriza leader appears, in fact, not very serious, not credible and somewhat ambiguous.
First, Tsipras is not serious when he threatens not to repay the debt. If he intends to remain in the single currency, as he says he wants to do and as 70 per cent of his fellow citizens ask, he cannot think of contributing to the construction of the Europe of the future with threats and blackmail. The weapon of blackmail, by the way, has already been used by the Greeks in the past and it didn't work. George Papandreou tried it, in the autumn of 2011, announcing his intention to hold a referendum on the first bailout plan (110 billion euro). The socialist leader wanted to test the Greeks' willingness to stay in the eurozone, aware that Greece's exit could lead to the collapse of the system with incalculable consequences for all member states, including Germany. The other leaders did not like the blackmail at all, the request for popular consultation was withdrawn and Papandreou was forced to resign. How can we seriously repeat the same approach that has already failed and would probably fail again, given that Greece's negotiating power today is far less than it was three years ago when the risk of contagion from the crisis was real?
Secondly, Tsipras is not credible when he defines the Greek debt as "unsustainable" and therefore calls for its partial cancellation. In reality, a write-off of 53,5 percent of the nominal value (about 100 billion euros) already took place in 2012 for private creditors. At the same time, Europe has granted a lengthening of maturities (up to 30 years) and a substantial reduction in interest rates. To date, the Greek state pays an average rate of 1,5 per cent, well even lower than the Italian one and, in fact, Greek interest expenditure is equal to 4,3 per cent of GDP (for a debt of 175.5 per percent) against Italy's 4,7 percent (and debt at 133 percent). Furthermore, thanks to the thirty-year maturities, the Greek state does not have to refinance itself while Italy, this year, has to place another 300 billion on the market. The combination of low interest rates, long maturities and growth estimated at around 3 per cent should allow – according to forecasts by the European Commission – a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio of as much as 8 percentage points in just one year, reaching 2015 per cent in 168.8 percent of GDP. If Tsipras succeeds in obtaining further debt relief on the basis of these parameters, then there would be quite a few countries ready to apply for such treatment!
Finally, Tsipras is somewhat ambiguous. In his electoral program (the so-called "Thessaloniki Program") he talks about a major plan to boost public investment (12 billion euros), raise pensions and the tax exemption threshold, as well as the minimum wage from 586 to 751 euros per month. He does not explain, however, how he will finance all this. Among other things, in the event of a debt cancellation, it will be difficult to find new lenders, since the Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and Europe - through the Fund for the Salvation of States - will not be available to offer further credit.
The Syriza leader is the first to be aware that he will have to reach a compromise. Also because he won't be alone to negotiate. In all likelihood, he will not have the numbers to govern and will have to form a coalition with the small centre-left parties: Pasok, To Potami and the new Change movement created in late December by former premier George Papandreou. It is difficult to imagine that these political forces, openly pro-European, are willing to raise the stakes.
This is why everything suggests that Alexis Tsiras, once in government, will be much softer, as Antonis Samaras has been in recent years. After all, he has no alternatives, as Angela Merkel often claims.
