With the statements made to the House on the case Ilva, the superminister Luigi Di Maio (aka Giggino De Rege) has shown, for the second time in a few days, that he is at least irresponsible. In fact, those who hold important institutional functions are not allowed to play with the skin of thousands of workers and with the prospects of a large steel company and the South for the sole purpose of throw mud on the previous government.
Also in this story - as in that of the decree (in)worthiness – Di Maio has spread very serious and unjustified accusations. He did so with regard to the non-existent "cold little hand" sabotaging, at night, the Technical Report (RT) of a decree law, adding inadmissible considerations and judgments by the offices and institutes that had carried out their tasks conscientiously and independently ; he did it again by evoking a "mess" in the tender that led to the sale of the iron and steel plant to a group interested in its rescue and development.
Proof of his gratuitous assertions he announced an internal investigation by the Ministry of Economic Development (although the investigating judiciary, which has done everything to cripple Ilva, has found nothing to complain about). According to the minister-little boy Acciaitalia's offer was better but "in the tender, half the score was given to the price and not to the environmental and health plan". As evidence of these claims he cited a letter from Raffaele Cantone (here it is again!) according to which a passage of the announcement was not well formulated. All this at the end of the race, when the alternative to selling is only the closure and scrapping of the plants.
For the moment no papers are seen; only accusations of malfeasance and conspiracies are heard now by internal lobbies, now by perverse multinationals. To give an idea of what this minister (whose resignation no one has asked for) was capable of coming up with, let's go back to the report of the facts regarding the table infiltrated by a "little hand" while the text was traveling (obviously not on foot). from via Veneto to the Quirinale (without the escort of carabinieri to whom Di Maio would later have entrusted the envelopes containing other measures, in order to avoid the deplorable tampering aimed at raising "caciara").
After reporting the event accompanied by threats in all directions, Giggino De Rege convinced Giovanni Tria to draw up a joint note in which - in order to shelter the State General Accounting Office (RGS) - the holder of the MEF contributed to download all responsibility on INPS (and on the president Tito Boeri) even recognizing (as an expert economist) the lack of scientific value of the offending table (where it was demonstrated that some provisions of the decree (in) dignity rather than creating new stable jobs destroyed what is there) and accredited even the existence of a "little hand" in the apparatuses (not of the RGS) to be rooted out with zeal and severity.
This was not a good story for Tria. Also because, if the table had really been questionable, his ministry could not have washed its hands of it, because it is up to the RGS to have the last word on the spending rules through "stamping". And this applies to all documentation, including that received from INPS. Beyond the implacable indictment by Tito Boeri in a hearing in the Chamber (the president of INPS demonstrated the provision ''with tears and blood'') it is the official documents that deny Di Maio: article 14 paragraph 2 of the decree itself where financial coverage is envisaged spread over several years, due to lower revenues (contributions and taxes) deriving from the reduction in the wage bill following the lower employment that will be created as a result of the new regulation of fixed-term work and the increase in compensation for unjustified dismissals.
Finally, the Dossier "Verification of the quantifications" by the Budget Service of the Chamber (July 18th) intervened. The document dissects the infamous Technical Report with great prudence and circumspection. He expands on the need to indicate whether the decrease in jobs can be classified as a direct or indirect effect of the new regulations, recalling that it is practice to follow a prudential assessment when dealing with the second case (indirect effects deriving from the behavior of people rather than from the device of rules).
In the case in question, after a long dissertation on the need for prudential precautions in also dealing with indirect effects, the Dossier concludes as follows: "As regards the case in question, it is noted that the RT, while arguing from the hypotheses referred to above, effects both positive and negative of the balances, estimates the burdensome net effects for each financial year, even if of an insignificant amount starting from 2021. Therefore, on the basis of the considerations highlighted above, on a methodological level, there do not seem to be any critical elements in relation to the criterion of prudence referred to above. With regard to the aforesaid reconstruction (present in the Technical Report and concerning the criteria adopted to determine the financial coverage needs, ed) it still appears necessary to obtain the Government's opinion”.
In essence, the executive is invited to give its opinion on the evaluation of the quantifications contained in the RT, which are by no means considered unfounded: that is, the government is called to exculpate itself or to refute the parameters adopted to calculate the reduction in employment.
These parameters are summarized as follows in the Dossier of the Budget Service of the Chamber: "The technical report preliminarily states that the estimates were made on the basis of the data relating to the new fixed-term contracts activated from 2014 to the first quarter of 2018 held by the Ministry of Labor and on the basis of information taken from the Inps archives. For the purposes of estimating the effects deriving from the reduction of the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts, the following hypotheses were formulated for the activations of each year:
- annual number of fixed-term contracts activated (net of seasonal, agricultural and PA workers and including agency workers), equal to 2 million, of which 4% (80.000) exceed the effective duration of 24 months;
- percentage of individuals who find no other job after 24 months equal to 10% (8.000);
- average monthly salary of 1.800 euros;
- further duration of the contract beyond 24 months equal to an average of 8 months;
- duration of Naspi under modified legislation equal to 12 months compared to the 16 months envisaged under current legislation.
The monthly salaries have been re-evaluated on the basis of the parameters contained in the DEF 2018".
