In an article published yesterday in "Il Sole 24 Ore" Luca Ricolfi argues as follows: "Behind that fury on the Reform there is also the erroneous belief that Italy's woes depend to a significant extent on the 1948 Constitution (...) Well, let me say that this is quite a bit of nonsense. Mafia, corruption, tax evasion, waste, inability to reduce taxes (….) depend 99% on us and on the greater or lesser seriousness of the governments we choose, and perhaps 1% on the fact that the Constitution has some defects and limits.”
I don't know what is the foundation that allows Ricolfi to affirm with such confidence that only such a small percentage of our troubles has a foundation in the Constitution. Personally I have a different idea, even if I am careful not to quantify "that non-negligible measure" of bad political institutions which, in my opinion, are at the basis of the bad performance of the Italian economy which has lasted for twenty years.
Of course, not all bad political institutions can be traced back to the Constitution, but perfect bicameralism has done some damage to the economy: it has multiplied by two (but sometimes even by 4 or 5) the possibility for parliamentarians to introduce articles and paragraphs that dilute the reforming systems carried out by governments (whether of the right or of the left without distinction); the last example is the law on competition which in two years has not yet been approved by Parliament.
And the stories of many laws of stability. On the other hand, our whole Constitution is pervaded by the "fear of the tyrant" and by the objective of making the power of the government and the Prime Minister mild. So it is if you like. And Renzi's attempt failed, we will return to the original Republic with the minorities blocking the majorities.
Nor do I share Ricolfi's optimism that Italians are little divided. Here too it is not clear on what evidence he bases his judgment. The electoral results and those released yesterday by Istat say something else: the country is strongly divided between North and South, between center and periphery, between rich and poor.
The first extreme of each of these polarities wants greater speed in public choices and achievements, innovation in institutional and entrepreneurial choices, whereas the second extreme (the South, the periphery of the country, the less well-off) understandably demands welfare, guarantees of own savings, security and no risk.
Bringing these two extremes closer together would be the task of a forward-looking policy: a policy that includes and does not divide, that offers opportunities by eliminating veto players while at the same time giving a sense of greater equity. Precisely what has been missing in the action of the Renzi government in the last year and a half.
