No distinction from the establishment, incomprehension of the international regressive wave, too little scrapping, too many internal divisions, subordination to the culture of the CGIL, icy sobriety instead of a strong identity in the electoral campaign: they arrive a little late and are a little too schematic but, to an impartial examination, the 10 reasons that the former secretary of the Pd, Matteo Renzi indicated, are largely shareable yesterday at the Ergife assembly to explain the resounding defeat suffered by his party in the general elections of 4 March. But he and even more so his entire party, which wavers between nostalgia for a past that will not return and impossible short-term revenge, other major problems escape, without solving which the construction of a democratic alternative to populism and sovereignty remains a pure chimera. In this process, the main mistake that looms over the Democratic Party is that of seeking the alternative starting from the rear, that is dividing itself on the sides, both internal and external, and on the choice of leaders before clarifying what it really wants and what the political objectives are. background in a society and in a world that seem to have lost their bearings.
It can also be understood that, after the beating of 4 March 2018, followed by other setbacks in the local administrations and preceded by that of the referendum of 4 December 2016 which is the mother of all defeats, a party experiences an inevitable shock to the point of doubt its future and the very usefulness of a vehicle like the Democratic Party. And it may also be that the autumn congress, after the parenthesis of the Martina secretariat, will help the Democratic Party to get out of the state of hypnosis in which it has ended up, but without fully reckoning with the reasons for its own crisis, it is unthinkable that it will begin the rescue and that the foundations be laid for the construction of an anti-populist and anti-sovereign alternative.
Net of his responsibilities and his mistakes, Renzi is certainly right in recalling that the Democratic Party was the last barrier to the populist drift and that waging an obsessive battle against the Democratic Party could not open the doors to the sun of the future but, as is punctually happened, to the nationalist right of the League and to the ambiguous and contradictory anti-system protest of the Five Stars. And it is equally true that, in addition to that of the democratic political forces, a severe self-criticism would be the responsibility of the entire ruling class, from the bureaucratic to the intellectual, from the industrial and financial one (what about the anti-euro papers conveyed by Mediobanca?) and even more to the trade unions, but above all to the big media, whose superficiality and political myopia often border on the improbable and are objectively among the reasons for Italy's involution.
So once upon a time there was the anti-populist embankment of the Democratic Party but, like it or not, that dam collapsed on March 4 and heated soups or hot pannicelli will not be enough to overturn the country's political horizon.
Three points seem inescapable if the Democratic Party wants to hope that the long crossing in the desert will trace a reformist, pro-European, anti-populist and anti-sovereign horizon.
WHAT IS THE POLITICAL PLATFORM?
Where does the Democratic Party want to go? What is your political project, what is your vision and what are your priority objectives, what future do you imagine for Italy and how does it respond to the great epochal challenges that cross our time? It is not enough to say Europe and reforms to build a democratic alternative: this is the starting point, but to meet the expectations of a society full of fears and without certainties, many other answers are needed through a cultural and ideal battle that accompanies the political one.
A few examples.
1) With regard to Europe, it is not enough to play defense in the face of the disintegration of the European Union caused by the sovereign front, but the alternative is built by attacking the sovereigns and asking public opinion the following question: is it true that Europe it is full of defects and needs to be profoundly reformed but it has guaranteed 60 years of peace and therefore do we want to preserve and improve this instrument of peace or do we prefer a future of conflicts between states?
2) Even on the euro, the democratic alternative can only start from a counteroffensive that goes to the heart of the problems and that asks Italians the following simple question: do you want to keep the single currency or do you want to lose overnight from 30 to 40 % of your salaries, your salaries, your pensions and your savings returning to the lira which will be worth just over half the euro?
3) Similarly, on work and social justice, the fight against populism demands clear and convincing answers. It is true that the economy is no longer in recession but why is Italy growing less than its other European partners and what does it matter to the new generations, who are not sure of a stable job, who often receive too low wages and who risk never have a pension, if the GDP improves by a few fractions of a point? And with regard to social inequalities, we cannot be satisfied with the fact that empirical evidence tells us that they have not grown in Italy: the objective of a democratic force must be to reduce them through greater growth (rather than the happy decrease that fascinates grillini) and a more equitable distribution of resources. But how? The gap between reality and perception of reality must be tackled from the root with more massive doses of reforms that do not cancel what has been done but go further and aim at a modernization of the country that has its main beneficiaries.
4) On security and immigration, the path taken by former minister Minniti has been recognized as a model by all of Europe, but if today the majority of the country is seduced by the muscular policies of the League, demonizations are not enough: something must be done more and better.
THE IDEA THAT ISN'T THERE
The League won the elections in the North by proposing a flat tax and the expulsion of 600 migrants while the Five Stars swept the South by proposing basic income. Everyone knows that these are bogus proposals that will not be implemented because, if implemented, they would ruin the state's accounts. But what is the alternative? The 100 diligent proposals of the Pd program elaborated by Professor Nannicini are not enough, which may be correct but which have no appeal and do not translate into a strong objective and an axis capable of giving a programmatic identity to the alternative and to excite the democratic public opinion. Need an idea? Yes, we need an idea that symbolizes the whole project and the reform program on which to build the alternative.
THE PLAYING FIELD AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ALLIANCES
In addition to the political projects and programmes, which are still lacking in the opposition, it is also necessary to have a clear understanding of what the playing field is. Will we still vote with proportional representation in the future or will we return to the majority? At present, the first hypothesis seems the most probable, perhaps strengthened by a higher majority bonus than that envisaged by the Rosatellum. But then, one cannot realistically think that a party like the Democratic Party which does not reach 19% will win 40 or 50% and that party would do well to bury forever the majority vocation of Veltronian memory and to address the problem of alliances, starting but from their own programmatic and identity discriminants. There are two proposals on the field: that of the Republican Front of Carlo Calenda, which hypothesizes an anti-populist alignment that ranges from the moderates of the center-right to the exiles of Leu; that of Nicola Zingaretti who essentially re-proposes the Brancaleone dell'Ulivo army by reopening the doors to Bersani, D'Alema but also to Fassina and its surroundings to then try to ally with the Five Stars. But neither of the two hypotheses, both top-down, seems convincing: the first because it can hardly get close to 51% of the voters and the second because it envisages heated ministers, who have already failed in the past, and subordination to the Five Stars. And Renzi, what do you think? Shall we have to wait for Leopolda to find out?
Programmatic contents and political alliances go hand in hand but even on this Renzi and the Democratic Party do not seem to treasure past experience for now. In a country dominated by corporations and consortia like Italy, it is pure illusion to think of changing reality with top-down reforms, as happened in the last legislature. Not only because the bureaucracy and the system rebel but because the recipients of the reforms themselves do not understand the benefits they can derive from it. The classic case is that of the Good School: the Renzi government has solved the problem of the scholastic precariousness that has been rotting for 20 years and has hired 100 new teachers but instead of gathering their consent, it has incredibly found them against it. Perhaps Renzi and the Democratic Party should ask themselves why and rediscover the value of what the sociologist Franco Ferrarotti calls social reformism, i.e. the construction of reforms through the involvement of the social subjects to whom the reforms are intended in harmony with the general interests of modernization of the country.
In short, the road to the democratic alternative to populism is long but without answering the crucial questions that constitute its essence, it is destined to remain a dream. Which unfortunately vanishes at dawn.
