This contribution by Thomas Friedman, a leading columnist for the "New York Times" and very familiar with international politics, is one of the best things we have written about the Biden administration's policy in Ukraine, in particular the direction it has taken in the last turn of time.
It is a very important contribution that brings it very close to the European positions that refer to Emanuel Macron and also to Mario Draghi.
We offer you the article that appeared in the “New York” newspaper in its entirety and in the Italian version.
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Better to talk a little
Growing up in Minnesota, I was a huge fan of the local hockey team, the North Stars, which had a sportscaster, Al Shaver, from whom I received my first lesson in military strategy and politics. He concluded his radio commentaries with this sentence: “When you lose, speak little. When you win, even less. Goodnight and good sport”.
President Biden and his team would do well to heed Shaver's maxim.
In Poland near the Ukrainian border last week, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin captured my attention – and certainly that of Vladimir Putin – when he declared that America's goal in Ukraine is no longer only to help Ukraine restore its sovereignty, but also to neutralize Russia. He said verbatim:
“We want to see Russia weakened to the point where it can no longer do the kind of thing it did by invading Ukraine. Frankly, it has already lost many of its military capabilities and quite a few of its troops as well. We don't want them to be able to replicate lost capabilities in a tight time frame."
Please tell me this statement is the result of a National Security Council meeting led by the President. And that they all together decided, after carefully weighing all the second- and third-order consequences, that it is in our interest and in our power to degrade the Russian armed forces to such an extent that they will no longer be able to express aggressive capability – soon? never? it is not clear – and that we can get it without risking a nuclear response from a humiliated Putin.
The consequences of free speech
I have no doubts: I hope this war ends with the Russian military severely downsized and Putin ousted. But I would never say that publicly if I were in charge, because it earns you nothing and can potentially cost you a lot.
Words in freedom sink ships and also lay the groundwork for outsized warfare, for inferences about the purpose of the mission, for a disconnect between ends and means, and for huge unintended consequences.
Biden's team has gone too far on this plan by bungling it that required too many corrective actions. For example, shortly after Austin's statement, a National Security Council spokesman said, according to CNN, that the secretary's comments reflected US goals, which is to "make this invasion a strategic failure for Russia."
Nice intention, but it is an artificial intention. Forcing Russia to withdraw from Ukraine does not mean declaring that we want to see it weakened to such an extent that it can no longer operate in that way: this is a vague war goal. How do you know when it has been achieved? And it's a never-ending process, will we forever continue to work for Russia's downsizing?
In March, in a speech in Poland, Biden said that Putin, "a dictator, bent on rebuilding an empire, will never erase a people's love of freedom," and then the president added, "For the God's sake, this man can't stay in power."
A clear and simple goal
The White House had to correct these words of the President by specifying that Biden "was not talking about Putin's power in Russia, or a regime change", but rather was pointing out that Putin "cannot be given permission to exercise power over its neighbors or the region".
Another free-word salad that convinces me that the National Security Council has not held a meeting to establish the boundaries at which US involvement in assistance to Ukraine begins and ends. Instead, it happens that the people of the Administration are free to speak and to act. This is not good.
Our goal started out simple and must stay that way. We must help the Ukrainians fight as long as they have the will and help them negotiate when they feel the time is right to do so, so that they can restore their sovereignty and we can reaffirm the principle that no country can devour a neighboring country. If you go too far, you risk trouble.
In what sense? To begin with, I don't want America to be responsible for what happens to Russia if Putin is overthrown. Because one of these three scenarios is very likely to occur:
(1) Putin is replaced by someone worse than him.
(2) Chaos erupts in Russia, a country with some 6.000 nuclear warheads. As we saw in the Arab Spring, the opposite of autocracy is not always democracy, but often disorder.
(3) Putin is replaced by someone better than him. A better leader in Russia would make the whole world better. I pray for this. But for this person to have legitimacy in a post-Putin Russia, it's imperative that he doesn't appear to have installed America. It must be a process that takes place in Russia and is recognized as Russian.
Which scenario is better
If we have scenario no. 1 or no. 2, I would not want the Russian people or the world to hold America responsible for unleashing prolonged instability in Russia. Do you remember our fear of "bombs on the loose" in Russia after the fall of communism in the 90s?
We also don't want Putin to separate us from our allies. Not all of our allies are willing to participate in a war whose goal is not only to liberate Ukraine but also to oust Putin. Without naming names, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently denounced that some NATO allies “want the war to continue. They want Russia to get weaker."
Remember: many countries of the world are neutral in this war because, however sympathetic to the Ukrainians they may be, they don't like to see America or NATO behaving like the bully of the moment – even towards Putin. If this is going to be a long war and Ukraine is able to recover all or most of its territory, it is imperative that it be perceived as Putin against the world, not Putin against America.
And let's be careful not to raise Ukrainians' expectations too much. Small countries that suddenly get the support of big powers can get drunk. Many things have changed in Ukraine since the end of the Cold War, except one: its geography. It is still, and always will be, a relatively small nation bordering Russia. He will have to make difficult compromises before this conflict ends. Let's not make it harder for them by adding unrealistic goals.
Ukraine is not Denmark
At the same time, one must be careful about falling in love with a country that just a year ago could not be found on a map after making 10 attempts. Ukraine has a history of political corruption and underworld oligarchs, but it was making progress towards democratic reforms before the Russian invasion. It hasn't become Denmark in the last three months, although, God bless them, many young people are trying and we want to support them.
But in 1982 I saw a movie that I can't get out of my head. The Israelis had fallen in love with the Christian Phalangists of Lebanon, with whom they allied to drive Yasir Arafat's PLO out of Beirut. Together they wanted to redesign the Levante, but they went too far. This has led to all sorts of unintended consequences: the Falangist leader was assassinated; Israel was bogged down in Lebanon; and in southern Lebanon a pro-Iranian Shia militia established itself and resisted the Israelis. It was called "Hezbollah". It now dominates Lebanese politics.
Have precise and limited goals
Biden's team has done well so far with its limited goals. It should stick to those.
Nader Mousavizadeh, founder and chief executive officer of Macro Advisory Partners, a geostrategic consulting firm, explained the work of the Biden administration well:
“The war in Ukraine has given the Administration an opportunity to bring to bear resources that only the United States has in today's world: that of forging and maintaining a global alliance of countries to deal with an act of authoritarian aggression; that of having a sanctioning economic superweapon that only the domination of the dollar in the global economy makes possible.
If the United States continues to use these two assets effectively - he added - they will greatly improve our long-term power and position in the world and will send a very powerful message of deterrence to both Russia and China".
In foreign affairs, success breeds authority and credibility, and credibility and authority breeds more success. The restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty alone, and the bankruptcy of Putin's military there, would be a huge achievement with lasting benefits. Al Shaver knew what he was saying: When you lose, say little. When you win, even less. Everyone can see the score.
From: Thomas L. Friedman, A Message to the Biden Team on Ukraine: Talk Less, The New York Times, May 3, 2002
