The story Grexit suggests two simple considerations related to each other on the future of the European Union, on the role of the different political classes and on that of the Germany for the future of the EU.
The variegated European tour company for the good death of the euro pretends not to know that monetary union and the rules of coexistence between states that it entails are not the point of arrival of European politics, but rather that of a difficult starting point to achieve some form of more less strong political integration among the member states.
But whatever the form of integration, it is based on the more or less accentuated transfer of political sovereignty from the individual nation states to the European Union, with the consequent formation of a European political class which cannot be constituted by the sole and simple sum of the political classes today dominant in the individual nation-states. The future will see the “I shuffle” of national parties and related political classes that many instead stubbornly want to oppose and avoid.
The loss of sovereignty, visibility and power of the national political class constitutes the real terror of the anti-euro political class which instrumentally opposes the euro itself to block any loss of political power in its little garden, which would disappear by melting into the larger dimension and in the vast sea of European politics.
The "national selfishness” are nothing more than the words with which the selfishness of the national political classes who want to survive European integration at all costs, also because they perceive themselves as inadequate for political competition on a European scale and for governing the complexity and the challenge that an area such a vast economy offers to the rest of the world. It is no coincidence that the political classes for the good death of the euro are also those who on the one hand regret the pre-globalization world and on the other consider a defeat of national democracy the duty to respect those rules deriving from belonging to an area, albeit still democratic , freely accepted monetary economy.
Unfortunately Germany, strong in its economic power but afflicted by political short-sightedness, offers a bank to the company for the good death of the euro and to that part of the European political classes anxious to survive.
Indeed, in the case of Grexit, Germany has won a battle (it didn't win big thanks to Mario Draghi) but it risks losing the war in the medium term even to the detriment of itself.
It is clear, as shown by the Grexit case, that the entire German political class distrusts not only the other European national political classes, but also the behavior of the other Community institutions (ECB in the first place), does not appear willing to transfer sovereignty to the European Union and fuels distrust and distrust among the member states.
Today, more than austerity is mutual distrust between states and between the European institutions what feeds the selfishness of the national political classes and undermines the European Union to its roots. Will Germany benefit from this?
The short-sightedness that afflicts the German political class prevents it from fully assessing that the economic challenge today takes place between large and cohesive political and economic areas and not between individual states. Unfortunately, it is not difficult to foresee that if the individual EU countries do not find economic, political and cultural advantages from being together, their slow exit from the EU will become probable to adopt economic policies that are currently prohibited. On the other hand, why favor only the German economy?
In a world of globalized financial markets, it will not be possible, as some hope, to be able to resort to public spending and public debt for domestic economic growth, but the real weapon of war will be, in the short and medium term, competitive devaluations of individual national currencies to fuel growth driven by exports and competition on international markets through price wars. It is not difficult to imagine that, in Europe, the German economy will necessarily be the battlefield of such a trade war which the German economy will hardly be able to resist.
It would therefore be desirable that Germany, also in order not to lose the war after having won a battle, would stop providing alibis to the company of populists for the good death of the euro, placing itself alongside the transversal European party that urges the albeit slow process of transfer of national sovereignty to the EU.
