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Greece: euro or drachma? This is the real stake of the referendum

Austerity policies have worked in various countries and are not the only ones responsible for the Greek disaster – Tsipras made a mistake by focusing on the old paradigm of “tax and spend” but the crisis in Athens has also exposed the inefficiencies of the European construction and who knows what does not end up pushing Europe to take the wing that has so far been lacking

Greece: euro or drachma? This is the real stake of the referendum

That Tsipras' strategy and tactics have so far been a complete failure cannot be disputed. It has not obtained new aid from Europe, it has not divided the countries of the Euro area politically, it has inflicted new suffering on Greek citizens both by causing a halt in the timid signs of recovery that had manifested themselves in 2014, and in recent days with the closure of banks and consequent currency rationing. Then he promoted a referendum with the excuse of giving the floor to the people, but in reality to try to get out of the dead end into which he had slipped. But since the goals of the referendum are unclear, hardly Tsipras, even in the event of a victory for the NO, he will be able to obtain strong concessions from the troika and above all to have greater viability to overcome the resistance of the left wing of his party, ie those who want to leave the Euro to make the anti-capitalist revolution and create "socialism in one country". If then the YES were to win, then the Government would have to resign and we should go quickly to new elections.

But how did it come to this? What are the elements of the complex game being played out over Greece and which, whatever the outcome, will have profound repercussions on the current structures of Europe? Beyond the hunt for those responsible which sees all the populist formations of both the right and the left in the front row, who find it convenient to blame Europe and German-style austerity for the impoverishment of European citizens, what needs to be done it is putting together data of objective facts to try to understand how it will end.

While rightly wanting to criticize many aspects of European policy in recent years (from the delays of the ECB in implementing an expansionary monetary policy, to the deafness of the Commission towards an investment plan financed by Brussels) austerity policies are not solely responsible for the Greek disaster. In fact, these policies have worked in Ireland and Spain, and in part also in Portugal and Italy, all countries which have returned to growth. And growth is all the stronger the more austerity policies have been declined through a cut in public spending and a reduction in taxes, both on businesses and on labour. In Greece, on the other hand, the role of the public sector has not been reduced enough to avoid an increase in taxes, especially those on companies. AND Tsipras wanted to continue raising taxes, especially on the middle class, instead of cutting spending, from pensions to the Armed Forces. In short, a classic left-wing policy that focuses on old “tax and spend” paradigm which has long since proved ineffective.

But after all, the Greeks will have to decide in a referendum whether it is more convenient for them to stay in the Euro or to leave it. A dilemma that the government desperately tries to deny by stating that the victory of the NO would not jeopardize belonging to the Euro area but rather would give more strength to the negotiators to bend the rigidity of the Troika. But it is a statement that does not take into account the substantial unity of the European governments not to give in to the blackmail of Greece because it makes no sense for a people to vote (democratically) to impose on other peoples to lend them the money necessary to carry on as before.

But would Greece really benefit from an exit from the Euro and a sharp devaluation of the Drachma? All those who also in Italy believe that the devaluation of the currency can solve the problems of competitiveness and growth, do not take into account that the collapse of the exchange rate is a real hidden tax which above all benefits pensioners and employees, nullifies the savings deposited in the bank (for this reason the Greeks withdrew them at a frenzied pace) can help exporters, provided that Greece has products to export which it does not seem to possess (apart from the armament and tourism). With the exit from the Euro the restructuring of the Greek economy should be even more drastic and faster than what they have started to do in the past years. In fact, bankruptcy would cause international credit to cease both for European institutions (Save States fund or individual governments or the ECB) and for private individuals at least until there is a credible stabilization of the new currency.

Ma the crisis in Athens has also exposed the inefficiencies of the construction of Europe and the lack of a decision-making center autonomous from the individual states, capable of making decisions that are valid for all in a short time. In addition, a possible exit of Greece from the Euro would undermine Mario Draghi's famous statement according to which the ECB would have done everything necessary to defend the Euro area. In short, the markets would be authorized to think that the Euro will no longer be irreversible and therefore the weakest countries could be attacked by speculation with disastrous consequences not only for the country under attack, but for the whole of Europe which at that point would risk dissolution . In short, the nationalists would win, it doesn't matter if they are of the right or of the left because in reality everyone wants an autarkic and statist policy. In Italy, for example, Salvini confirmed that the public companies of local authorities should not be sold, that it was a mistake to put cooperative banks on the market, and that retirement pensions must be restored (therefore more taxes for everyone, rather than a flat tax). . And after all, Tsipras has staked his cards precisely on the fear that not widening the purse strings towards Greece would have led to such an earthquake in Europe as to advise against such a gamble. But game was mishandled, with the arrogance of the debtor who thinks he has nothing more to lose, and threatens the creditors to bring disorder into their house. But Varoufakis, who claims to be an expert in game theory, has miscalculated this time, he has covered the European institutions with insults, going from provocation to provocation, to the point of inducing all the other partners to accept the challenge and see if the Greeks really want to break away from Europe.

However, in the short term, a serious discussion on the need for proceed towards closer integration, including political integration. The objective will not be achieved in a short time, but steps forward must be seen immediately in some important fields: banking and financial union, some chapters of budgetary and fiscal policy, a more integrated defense, and part of the debts ( at least the new ones) in common.

In the end, perhaps, even the Greek drama could turn out positively. Making further progress in the European one which is an indispensable construction if the old European countries are to still want to play a role in the new context of global markets. 

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