Admitted and not granted, that the twists and turns are really over and that this is finally a weekend with a happy ending both for Athens and for the whole of Europe, those who think that the Greek emergency and the fragility of the Old Continent are deluding themselves intended to be archived.
Il Tsipras plan with 13 billion in cuts and higher taxes in 2 years seems to have opened the doors to an agreement that Greece and its creditors have not been able to reach in 5 months of exhausting negotiations and which, if confirmed, will avoid the bankruptcy of Athens in extremis. But at least three problems remain on the table, one bigger than the other.
The Eurogroup will X-ray the Greek plan today but the first reactions of the creditors give rise to hope of an agreement and expose a paradox that Veronica De Romanis had already reported in unsuspecting times on FIRSTonline namely that, by rejecting Juncker's June 26 plan to go to the referendum, Tsipras would have been forced to present a more austerity plan. As has promptly happened, pace of Syriza militants and voters. But politics, as we know, is the art of the possible and the impossible and all's well that ends well, if indeed the longed-for agreement is reached.
Even in the best of possible hypotheses, this weekend's European summits, which begin and perhaps end with the Eurogroup, still leave open problems which, sooner or later, we will have to come to terms with again.
The former, conveniently referred to by Donato Masciandaro in the editorial on Friday in the "Sole 24 Ore", brings it back to the front state of health of Greek banks. After two weeks of bank closures due to lack of liquidity and after two weeks of impressive and highly symbolic lines of Greeks at ATMs, Greek banks will reopen on Monday but, even if the nightmare of bankruptcy fades, their balance sheets are ominous and it will require a recapitalization that will enable them to return to being truly a vital lung of the Greek economy and which perhaps deserves a relay between the ECB and the European Stability Fund (ESM) for the search for the necessary financial resources.
The second question directly calls into question the Greek debt and its solution. It is a complex problem but in front of which it is useless to hide one's head in the sand. Greece will never be able to repay a public debt like the one it has accumulated over the years but Tsipras is the first to realize that, beyond the reckless electoral promises, today there are no political conditions in Europe to ask for its cancellation or a robust cut. If Europe were to give Greece too many discounts on its debt, Slovenia would rise up, and then Lithuania and then Portugal again and then perhaps even Italy. The Greek debt problem is on the table but its complete solution is not for today.
Realistically, Tsipras himself has proposed not the cancellation or the cut but the restructuring of the Greek debt and that is a further reduction of the rates, which are already lower than the Italian ones, or - more opportunely - a lengthening of the maturities. And just as realistically, the German hawk Schaeuble admitted that the margins are narrow but – and this is no recent novelty – that Greek debt restructuring it can be discussed.
An agreement in extremis between Greece and Europe to avoid the default and the exit of Athens from the euro and perhaps from Europe and which avoids cataclysms on the financial markets which, in the presence of a definitive peace, would be ready to take off again by rocket towards new records, as they have already made it clear they want to do. But there is a third problem, which is the biggest of all and which certainly cannot be resolved in this boiling weekend and it is the one that calls into question the very role of Europe.
The painful history of migrants and the Greek one are there to say that the European Union is losing pieces every day and that we cannot go on like this. Resign to making Europe a mere commercial exchange area as Great Britain would like, or dare to make a qualitative leap towards the political unity of Europe? This is the dilemma of our age, with respect to which there are no alternatives, let alone populist shortcuts.
The four knights of defeatism – from Grillo to Salvini and from Brunetta to Fassina – can squawk all they want about the euro and Europe but without Europe and without the single currency it would be worse for everyone. And it would be time to say loud and clear that those who promise to leave the euro would actually like to halve the assets and incomes of their fellow citizens overnight.
But today's Europe is not what we need: we don't just need more Europe and more European political unity but we need another Europe, a Europe finally devoted to development through innovation and guided by a governance without antiquated diarchies but also without the dictatorship and vetoes of minorities. Anyone who does not move in this direction only opens the doors to populisms and nationalisms that have only sowed war in the past.
It is too early to tell, but if the Greek tragedy will have served to push Europe to finally become aware of the unsustainability of its errors and its limitations, it will be necessary to recognize that once again "oportet ut scandala eveniant"
