The second weekend of July 2015 will be remembered as one of the hottest in the history of Europe. And not only for the heat but for the repeated shocks and thrills that the exhausting negotiations between Greece and Europe caused both Athens and the Old Continent to run away, removing the abyss of Grexit only in extremis, of the bankruptcy and the exit of Athens from the euro.
"It wasn't a foregone conclusion and we really risked Grexit twice" he commented without triumph but with some hint of legitimate pride Matteo Renzi. Could more and better be done? Certainly yes, because in retrospect one can always do more and better, in politics as in life. But you could also do less or worse and for the first time, the maximalism of the guided German hawks Wolfgang Schaeuble and the amateurism of the Greeks of Alexis Tsipras they made us realize that Grexit was not just a laboratory hypothesis.
We have already seen many highlights over the past few days and it is probable that we will also see others in Italy: "Enough with the humiliation of Greece", "Enough with Europe under German hegemony", "Enough with Italy dominated by of Merkel”, “Stop giving money to Athens”. Everything and more. We already seem to hear the prophets of Italian worstism from Grillo to Salvini and from Fassina to Brunetta. Ours, as we know, is a country of missing coaches from the national football team. Everyone is convinced that they are better than those who have to decide and for everyone the glass is always half full but the logic of politics is not that of discussions between friends at the bar.
Two elements of trivial wisdom should never be forgotten: 1) only having 51% of the consensus in hand (but in this case in Europe and not only in Italy) can one think of making one's point of view prevail entirely (but which one? Pro Greece? Pro Germany? Pro Europe?); 2) in a democracy, politics is by definition based on compromise, that is, on a meeting point between initially different theses: it is a question of verifying the quality of the compromise but compromise as such is the salt of politics.
Let us therefore try to evaluate the agreement on Greece in the light of the interests of the parties involved and let us try, with all the risks and partiality of the case, to draw up the report cards from Greece, Europe and Italy.
GREECE: vote 4
It must be recognized Alexis Tsipras a good dose of courage and ruthlessness: first with the referendum and then with the yes to the final agreement. But politics is not a game of poker and to think of blackmailing or outwitting longtime politicians like Merkel or Schaeuble when he presents us at the negotiating table with saucer in hand is either childishly naïve or terribly amateurish. And the results have been seen.
Probably the final agreement with Europe did not have and has no alternative for the Greece if not bankruptcy and Grexit, but there is no doubt that, on balance, the proposal that President Juncker presented to Tsipras on 26 June was enormously more favorable to the Greek people than that of the final agreement even if there it is to be hoped that, albeit in articulo mortis, the Parliament of Athens will now approve it. At the time there was no ultimatum to carry out the reforms in three days, there was no 50 billion Guarantee Fund and the role of the Monetary Fund itself appeared more secluded.
But on 26 June Tsipras – not Schaeuble and not Merkel – surprisingly thought of screwing everything up by rejecting the Juncker plan and taking refuge in the saving referendum, which would have had a completely different meaning if it had been announced a month earlier and which, appearing instead as an act of defiance of creditors (whom former minister Varoufakis, the main culprit of the Greek defeat, has kindly defined as "terrorists"), it has undermined the trust and credibility of Greece in front of all of Europe and not just in front of Germany.
Tsipras pays the lunar promises with which he won the Greek elections but, with all the understanding of this world, a continent of 500 million inhabitants cannot be asked to shoulder the illusions of a part of the 11 million Greeks. The opinion of Greek voters must be respected but not that of other European countries?
Unfortunately, while finally wanting to meet the European interlocutors to obtain the aid that alone would have avoided the bankruptcy of Athens, Tsipras made yet another gyration by presenting at the latest Brussels negotiation a new plan full of good intentions but such as to jeopardize definitely the trust in Europe in his regards. What is the real Tsipras? The one that rejects the generous Juncker plan or the one that presents a much more austere Greek plan?
The outcome of the negotiations with Europe is mainly the result of somersaults and the amateurish management of the Tsipras-Varoufakis couple and unfortunately the price will be paid by the Greek people who, in words, everyone says they want to defend even when they thought they were defending baby or retirements at 60 which no longer exist anywhere in Europe. Now the bill is salty.
EUROPE AND GERMANY: vote 5
It is true that for the third time theEurope save Greece, but when in recent months and days has the European Union glimpsed a forward-looking plan for its future and above all a soul? It is true that new loans cannot be lightly granted to Greece, which has already received many and who knows if it will repay them, but Europe cannot be made up only of financial rigor and the search for technical agreements with a minimum wage . Perhaps, as Romano Prodi argues, it was a sensational mistake to open the doors of the Eurozone to Greece, which was tampering with its budgets, but throwing it out now would have hurt Athens but also all of Europe, both financially and in terms of credibility politics.
Everyone knows it, and the Monetary Fund has reminded it, that the Greek public debt is unsustainable: sooner or later the problem of its restructuring will arise and it is better to have clear ideas about it. One can also renounce part of one's credits rather than resort to hot cloths, but it is right to demand structural reforms from Athens, which are also Greece's only hope of growth.
Is it Germany's fault if Europe appears soulless and so uncertain in its mission? Whoever matters most certainly bears more responsibility even if Greece's faults should not be forgotten. Berlin has its reasons not to trust Greece but it is sad to remember that in crucial moments of history - from the First World War to Nazism and the Second World War - Germany has always failed and perhaps would have done so this time too if the European doves and the Merkel herself had not shelved the dangerous project of Grexit for 5 years advanced by Schaeuble. As the German economist Daniel Gros, director of the prestigious Ceps in Brussels, well said, "it is not acceptable that the powerful and respected German finance minister officially asks for Grexit for 5 years: this is a provocation". And what about his quarrel with a man of Mario Draghi's balance and wisdom?
The hope is that Europe will reflect on itself and finally find its way back, under the banner of solidarity and development: not only on Greece but on migrants, on the Mediterranean and on many other issues, not least governance, knowing that either the Europe finds the wing in the direction of political union and a new relationship with its peoples or it will inevitably face its own decline.
ITALY: vote 7
Raise your hand if you haven't felt annoyed in recent days when it seemed that the fate of Europe and Greece depended on the Merkel-Hollande directorate. Some say that Renzi he should have more courage and fight, admitted and not granted that it is easy, to enter the directorate. But there are also those who argue that it would be a useless effort because times have changed and the directory is already dead. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. What is certain is that the Italian premier initially chose a wait-and-see tactic, but in the end he brought home the results, favorable to Greece but above all to Europe and Italy.
Without triumphalism but with pride, as he himself said at the end of the negotiations on Greece, Renzi claimed to have contributed - together with the French president Hollande - to having convinced Merkel and the other European partners to close the Schaeuble project of Grexit for 5 years and that it also induced them to agree to move the seat of the Guarantee Fund from Luxembourg to Athens. In this way Renzi has lent a hand to Greece but he gave it above all to Europe which, otherwise, would have faced an unprecedented crisis, but above all he gave it to Italy, which would inevitably have suffered the contagion of the crack in Athens.
As you can see, it doesn't matter who shouts the most but who knows how to do it at the right time and who brings home results. The rest is sports bar stuff.
