The fall in Italian industrial production is only partly attributable to the current recession in Europe. To a large extent it is due to internal reasons, both structural and political, and it is on these causes that we should try to intervene to reverse the current trend. These causes are, mainly: 1) the drastic reduction in the number of large companies and the consequent lack of adequate "drivers" in some key sectors of national industry such as, for example, telecommunications, information technology, chemistry, automotive, etc; 2) the "loneliness" of medium-sized enterprises when they have to carry out the generational change and internationalise; 3) the lack of adequate support from the credit system which, in certain cases, takes on the character of a real lockout and, last but not least; 4) the unsustainable burden of taxes and contributions.
Each of these problems is a consequence of wrong political choices as well as of failure to implement reforms. It applies to everyone the case of the privatization of Telecom. If it had really been "privatized", and not "pirated" instead (that is, impoverished of its resources and indebted), Telecom could have created broadband much earlier without having to resort, as we are forced to do today, to the funds of the Cd.P. The fall of industrial production can therefore also be seen as the consequence of the failure to implement economic, social and institutional reforms which are essential for growth.
One could say that, in a sense, it is the "mathematical representation" of the political failure of the Second Republic. The knot to untie is therefore that of reforms. In Italy there is a formidable conservative social and political block, completely transversal, which includes a large part of the Trade Unions and Business Associations and which unites left and right forces as well as castes and corporations of all kinds and types. A block that has so far prevented the reform of schools, universities and research. That has hindered the reform of the labor market and industrial relations. Che it has plastered the country by limiting mobility and depressing creativity. A conservative bloc whose extraordinary ability to resist change is at the origin of Italy's most dramatic problem: the collapse of productivity.
Productivity is the result of a synergistic effort between companies, schools, universities, research centres, institutions and the state. It is the main indicator not only of the dynamism of the economic and industrial sector but of the ability to innovate of society as a whole. Its fall therefore gives us the exact measure of the gravity of the crisis we are experiencing. Productivity growth is the only lever we can use to get back on track and reposition ourselves on the world market and in the international division of labour, but this today requires reforms far more than investments. What can we reasonably do? We must multiply in all fields the reform effort of which the Monti government has given some initial evidence.
In the labor market and in the industrial relations system we must move decisively towards co-management. In schools and universities we must affirm the principle of merit (for students) and that of quality (for teachers). In research, we need to strengthen the links between universities and research centers with businesses, while we need to ask the banking system to return to its function, which is to support the production and investment efforts of businesses. Reforms will also have to be made in the Public Administration. The spending review only makes sense if it is conceived as a lever to restructure the public machinery. That is, if it promotes a new model of bureaucracy and the state and, above all, a new model of welfare. If it were limited to cutting here and it would be of little use.
Finally, we must implement an effective industrial policy. No random interventions, of course, but strong support for innovation and internationalisation. Not a thousand Projects but a few targeted special Projects, such as broadband or rail transport. Alongside this, a declaration is essential commitment to strengthen our (few) large companies and not to repeat the mistakes of the past. There was not only the Telecom affair. There was also that of Parmalat, which could very well have remained Italian, and there was also BNL. Defending the strategic nucleus of the national production system is not "statism" but industrial policy. Today, alongside Eni, Enel (virtuous examples of relationships with private individuals) we have only Finmeccanica which represents the most important technological aggregate in our country. If, for whatever reason, it were to be dismantled or seriously weakened the damage to the country would be enormous. Economic and social reforms are therefore needed to get back on track and recover productivity. But the economy and industry also need institutional reforms. In fact, those that no longer hold up are the architraves of our institutional system. We can go towards semi-presidentialism or towards the chancellorship, but one thing is certain: without a major change, comparable to that achieved after the war, it will be very difficult for Italy and its industry to avoid decline.
