The recent decrease in the supply of Russian gas has been tackled in Italy through the mechanisms that are usually activated in crisis situations such as the suspension of the supply of interruptible customers (i.e. those subjects who accept the risk of interruption in exchange for lower bills ) and activation of fuel-oil power plants which allow for a reduction in gas consumption for the generation of electricity.
Obviously, it is easy to draw a parallel with the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2006 and 2009, when a serious dispute arose between the two states led to a considerable reduction in the gas available in many European countries and above all showed the great dependence on Russian imports . However, it would be unfair not to notice how the situation has improved over the years, even if evidently not enough.
In primo luogo, Italy has become not only less dependent on Russia but also able to build a more diverse portfolio of suppliers. In fact, not only did the share of Russian gas imports on the Italian total drop from 32% to 29,9% between 2005 and 2009 (AEEG data) but also, using a market concentration index (Herfindahl-Hirschman) , we note a progressive decrease in the concentration of the weight of individual producing countries on the total of Italian imports.
Secondly, the crisis has had a minor impact at the European level thanks to some changes imposed by Brussels. First of all, "reverse flow" mechanisms have been installed which allow, in the event of a decrease in Russian supply, to reverse the flow and therefore to have gas flow from west to east towards those countries which are more vulnerable to Gazprom's decisions.
Also, an important novelty factor is the entry into force of European regulation No. 994/2010 which requires Member States to ensure a supply of gas to "protected customers" for at least thirty days in the event of "... exceptionally high gas demand, as well as in the event of a failure of the main gas infrastructure in average winter conditions”.
However, it remains clear how these European measures do not solve the root problem of dependence on a single producer and must be complementary to a strategy of diversification of sources. The Brussels strategy sees the creation of the South Corridor as one of its key points, i.e. a route that brings natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe. However, for this project to really mess up the cards for European imports, as Wood MacKenzie's analysts point out, the influx of gas must be large enough. From this point of view, Nabucco with its transport capacity of 31 bcm per year has always had strong support from the European Community.
However, the project has never managed to take off and in particular two recent events suggest the possibility of a strong downsizing. In the first place, on 26 December a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan for the construction of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline. This deal provides for the construction of a gas pipeline that will source from the Shah Deniz gas field, the same field targeted by the Nabucco project, leading many analysts to question whether there is enough gas to make Nabucco construction feasible. In fact, the Nabucco project would appear to be oversized even if it were the only gas pipeline linking Azerbaijan to Europe, considering that the Shah Deniz field will produce around 2017-10 bcm per year in 16 against a hypothetical capacity of transport equal to 31 bcm/y.
A second blow for Nabucco has always arrived at the end of 2011 when Turkey gave the go-ahead for the construction of South Stream, a competing project of Nabucco, on its territory. This pipeline would allow Gazprom to supply the southern and eastern regions of Europe directly, avoiding the risk of transit (eg new disputes with Ukraine) but it certainly would not solve the European problem of diversifying the countries of origin of the gas.
According to various analysts, the Nabucco project is strongly threatened by these recent developments. Although the shelving of the project would force a review of the diversification policy of European sources, it could represent an opportunity for Italy. Indeed, the uncertainty associated with the construction of Nabucco opens the door to two interconnection projects, namely the Turkey-Greece-Italy consortium (a consortium of which Edison is a member) and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline, to bring Azeri gas directly from Turkey to Italy. The possibility for Italy to function as a European hub for Armenian gas and, in the event of a future supply crisis attributable to Russia, to be able to count on another source of supply would bring clear benefits.
