The world of gods local public services has now become one of the most emblematic places of ideological confrontation of the last twenty years, which has produced so much, however, in terms of conferences, bills, trashed regulations and consultancy to the point of being able to affirm that the cost is certainly high accumulated for the collectivity of the persistent stasis of renewal. If so much time has passed, however, I don't think that this is attributable to the fact that in this "world" there are, on the one hand, good and willing liberals animated by the desire to free an amazing latent production system under local monopolies and, on the on the other hand, bad mayors-entrepreneurs who block the way for the action of an imaginary market that promises public happiness from private cynicisms. Come on, the division of complex social issues into “good” and “bad” throughout history has only ever created perverse regressive coalitions. Let's try, then, a materialize a rapid process of reform with a real effort of simplicity and pragmatism, let's try to restart from common sense and the derivatives of empirical evidence, definitively abandoning ideologies.
So far I have dealt with aspects of a general nature. Now some dutiful critical observations with respect to the recent regulatory framework and then move on to the equally dutiful proposals.
Criticisms. Reviving, e facto, the 23bis is wrong, both because it lends itself to inconclusive complications, and because it risks being unconstitutional, and because it re-proposes ideological approaches that create questionable asymmetries between the models regardless of their results, i.e. without placing the burden of "proof of facts" for all management companies, whether public, mixed, private or listed. Creating ex-ante asymmetries, if you think about it, is either contradictory to efficiency goals or simply hypocritical. At the center should always and only focus on "responsibility for results". Example: ending up sanctifying the legitimacy of the unregulated monopoly of listed companies to the point of making it "the reference model" is in contradiction with any community principle and norm. Another example: if what matters is only the efficiency and effectiveness of an operational structure, then the current "fashion" of condemning, both de facto and de jure, in-house with asymmetrical disincentives is simply either incorrect or contradictory . Last example: imposing the obligation to consolidate the financial statements of companies in-house with that of the relative Municipalities is technically almost impossible, certainly difficult and incomplete. But, above all, it would induce asymmetries among citizens: those who live in places where the In-House model is applied would find themselves suffering very severe restrictions on local public investments, while those who live in cities with privatized service companies or companies selected through some form of race, beyond the "results", would not suffer restrictions!
Let's try, then, to set up a real modern and structural reform of the utilities system, no longer placing the "models" at the center, but their "results". This would be consistent with Community principles and rules. This would inhibit discussions of "indefensible defenses". We try to be simple in regulating, effective in regulating, quick in timing and, above all, unscrupulous in highlighting (or "bare") the results of the actions. A first consequence? The unmasking of inefficiencies derives from the centrality of the result often and vulgarly attributed both to "political trumpets" who administer public companies with teams of consultants-substitutes to the detriment of efficiency, and to improbable managers who populate protected sectors.
The proposal? As recently published in the Utilities Management Review, we eliminate any form of "transitional period" for the introduction of tenders, but not as an absolute dogma, but as a "progressive validation" of the work of all existing operators. In other words, it would be a question of a "time-scaled tender obligation" based on a simple benchmarking of empirical results of existing operators. It could be quickly implemented by a competent Regulatory Authority, perhaps already existing.
Obviously it becomes central to study an effective "litmus paper". In summary, the proposal is based on a dual evaluation methodology: a procedure for assuming responsibility for qualitative performance and a composite indicator for "relative efficiency".
The composite indicator of relative efficiency could simply be found, in a tariff regulation system based on the principle of full-Cost-Recovery, from the existing weighted average tariff net of an "investment index" attributable to per capita depreciation or to the 'increase in sector fixed assets per unit of regulated product. To this must obviously be added the "unit sectoral deficit" and any "unit subsidy received" (if the first is an implicit subsidy from the financing partner, the second is an explicit subsidy from third parties). In this way, those who may have low tariffs, but deriving from scarce investments and sustainable yields from public subsidies, could find themselves at the bottom of the relative efficiency ranking and have to immediately go out to tender.
And the much-heralded "problematicity of quality"? We no longer resort to the typically theoretical-juridical approach whereby complex contracts protect the requisites of articulated quality, a typical aspect of many in Public Tenders that end up in long and costly legal disputes, but mechanisms of "preventive self-definition" of the sanctions for failure to achieve the quality standards are introduced. Nobody would discuss the onerousness of a sanction imposed on previously self-reported criteria and levels.
Finally, what can be done to eliminate the persistent recourse to politicized, unprofessional and inexperienced managers? Directors without adequate skills, who often occupy prominent positions on the boards of in-house companies? Publish their CVs on the Internet and calibrate the fees not on those of the Statutory Auditors, but only on the results achieved.
Times? A line of reforms of this characterization could be implemented within a few months and, with the new year, we will see subjects competing without any possibility of defense due to the bad results in terms of relative efficiency.
