La consolidated liturgy of the meetings between Trump and his foreign interlocutors is that they begin with a meeting in the Oval Office with the interlocutor and a few close friends in the presence of some selected journalists. The purpose is to exchange pleasantries, to titillate theTrump's ego and prepare for the serious discussion that will take place in a confidential context. At the end, a joint press conference. Who has the patience to watch the entire fateful fifty minutes of theTrump and Zelensky meeting on Friday exploded in the first stage, it will be hit first by the lunghezza. The exchange began with the usual bilateral, mutually friendly pleasantries. Then it dragged on as the crux of the problem emerged. In essence, theincompatibility between two different needs: that of Trump, recognizing that his signature alone is enough to make an agreement credible and that of Zelensky, of having solid guarantees in the face of an undoubtedly unreliable adversary.
After forty minutes of a very polite discussion, the situation exploded following an impromptu and offensive intervention by Vance against Zelensky. The last minutes are the ones we all know. Even those who are resistant to conspiracy theories are tempted to think that the one aimed at Zelensky in the Oval Office was a trap and that the the breakup was deliberate from the beginning. Otherwise why would Trump, master of ceremonies, have allowed an important and predictable discussion, which should have taken place in private, to drag on for so long and in public? Witness Trump's final sentence: this was great tv. Faced with the same question about guarantees from Macron and Starmer, Trump had chosen to avoid answering. All this, among other things, comes after the sensational vote at the UN that saw the US aligned with Russia and China against Europe.
What is Trump's strategy?
At this point, the first question that arises is what does trump want? One answer is that he wants an agreement with Putin whatever the cost to Ukraine and Europe; but for what purpose? Perhaps for economic advantages, but those still seem very modest. Perhaps to try to separate the Russia from China; an inverted parallel of what Nixon did in his time. The problem is that when Nixon and Kissinger carried out the brilliant operation, relations between China and the USSR had already deteriorated significantly. Those between present-day Russia and China, on the other hand, continue to consolidate. They can perhaps be attenuated, but a sudden change of course by Putin is not credible. Another theory then arises: that for Trump the agreement with Putin is only the first piece of a larger plan of agreement between the great powers for the division of influence on world affairs. In essence, a New Yalta at a planetary level. In this perspective, the next sacrificial victim would be Taiwan. But it is unlikely to work in a world full of middle powers jostling to expand their room for maneuver. The advantages for Russia and China would be obvious.
It is not visible, apart from the Trump's personal glory, what the US would gain. The negative repercussions would be felt not only in Europe, but also among the allies of the America in Asia. The US would go in a few months from being at the centre of the largest network of alliances that history has ever known, to a situation of substantial isolation and conflict especially with its allies. America's power would rest only on force, certainly considerable, but which Trump theorizes he does not want to use. Finally, there is a third hypothesis: that Trump has no overall vision and that he addresses the problems separately, only in a opportunistic and driven by a particular form of megalomania.
and sensible people are right to continue to hope that within the american company and especially in the republican party, let the forces of reason awaken before it is too late. deafening silence from republican senators It is disturbing, but in the media close to the Republican Party one can read severe analyses. The majority of Republicans in Congress is still very fragile and a Democratic Party less stunned by the defeat would have ample room for maneuver. Also because, in addition to the contradictions of foreign policy, Trump will soon have to face the consequences of its internal policy, especially economic. Speculating on these developments does not make much sense today because it will take time anyway and there are emergencies that cannot wait.
The role of Europe
Under these conditions, what can and must theEurope? We actually have two imperatives. The first is to quickly adopt credible measures: concrete actions, not intentions or procedures. The second is not to do promise that we would not be able to maintain. The division between these two imperatives is very subtle, but not impossible to manage. The dilemma that we have is the following. If we consider the forecasts of the main analysts, the additional effort that Europe must face to make its defense capacity credible in the face of the Russian threat is economically bearable even if considerable: less than two points of GDP for the EU and the United Kingdom. The problem is that, even if the decisions that are needed were taken today, it would take time to follow them up effectively. In the immediate future and for a period of time to be determined, it would be impossible, both on an industrial and operational level, not to have support Rainforest; a difficult card to play but not impossible. After all, a greater European commitment is one of Trump's main requests; many will have noticed his excessive praise for Poland during the meeting with Starmer. Those who urge not to interrupt the dialogue with America; which also involves encouraging the resumption of constructive but not humiliating dialogue between Zelensky and Trump. Equally important is the contact that other allies have with Trump's America similar problems to ours.
Although not unaffordable, the commitment that is required of Europe still requires a strong mobilization of public opinion. It is only possible around a shared vision of the Russian threat. In the face of the conflict in Ukraine, we are indeed witnessing two opposing visions even among those who do not hesitate to attribute responsibility for the war to Putin. For some, it is essentially a conflict that concerns Ukraine; Trump shares this vision, but he is not the only one. He goes even further by sharing many of the theses of Moscow. There are those who believe that the current war is only one component of an irreconcilable conflict between the Putin's Russia and Europe; a conflict that will end only when Russia has overcome the imperial vision it has of the world and of itself. Only this second analysis is capable of mobilize opinion.
A divided Europe
This dilemma, which clearly divides us from Trump, also exists in Europe. The Scandinavians, Baltics , Poland have clearly surpassed it. This is probably also true for the Britain. In large countries, France, Germany and Italy, misunderstandings are numerous on both the right and left of the political spectrum. Macron has made this clear, but he still has to convince the country. It is striking that many of those who bitterly criticize the “Trump's peace” they are the same ones who three years ago expressed opposition to a "proxy war" that Biden's America was dragging us into and called for European initiatives in view of a peace not dissimilar to the one that Trump is predicting today. It is also striking the chorus of those who explain to us that "therefore de Gaulle was right". Perhaps forgetting that Europe fromAtlantic to Urals De Gaulle's vision was not very different from Trump's: distant from America, based on independent nations, friendly with Russia and above all indifferent to the fate of other Eastern European countries. clarity of vision It is therefore an essential premise for the credibility of the European strategy.
stay thelast question: what is Europe? It is clear that it will not be the 27. The only solution is a coalition of the willing which starts from the arc that goes from Scandinavia to Poland and includes Germany, France and the United Kingdom; three countries without which there would be no critical mass. All this with the benevolent external support of the EU institutions. Important support because of the inevitable connection with the economic dispute that they will be called upon to manage. The turning point will only occur when such a group of countries will present the others with the fait accompli of a defined position. A position that will have to credibly address the urgent short term, i.e. support for Ukraine, and the medium term, i.e. the construction of a European "strategic autonomy". At that point the other EU members will have to decide. The choice of Giorgia Meloni will be particularly difficult because it will put the balance of his government coalition at stake. The operation is not impossible, but it is above all all the more urgent because there is the danger that Trump will immediately interrupt the military support to Ukraine. Failure would mean that Zelensky and Ukraine would be left alone despite all verbal displays of affection. A moral defeat from which Europe could hardly recover.
