It could be a new East-West clash, a repeat of that Cold War which froze theEurope during the XNUMXth century, but there are important differences that particularly concern the Old Continent.
Let's start with the most worrying signals: the conflict in Ukraine, together military, political and energy, the sanctions imposed on Russia, the rush to develop new ones nuclear army, an American brigade sent to reinforce Poland, the new theater missiles deployed from Moscow to Kaliningrad, the growing Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, Moscow's heavy interference in American and European internal politics, the fake news, cyber “war”, etc. There is more than enough to fuel a new Cold War.
Change of pace with respect to the USSR
However, there are also significant differences with the past. First, this Russia, while remaining a nuclear superpower and a major conventional military power, is not the equivalent of the old Soviet Union, it does not occupy half of Germany and Europe, and it does not pose the same level of threat.
Secondly, the political and ideological context is different. With the disappearance of the Communist International, Moscow's political allies today are above all the new European populists: those same ones, moreover, who are in harmony with the political vision of US President Donald Trump. It is no longer the great capitalism-communism confrontation, nor the traditional one between democracy and dictatorship. And it is no longer a clear ideological confrontation between East and West. It is rather a race to establish who will have the upper hand in Europe, among powers which, at least at this stage, do not share the values and policies established in the European Union, in the security environment guaranteed by theAtlantic Alliance.
Of course, this American administration does not want to lose Europe to Russia and, at least in its strategic documents, it recognizes the great advantages it derives from its system of alliances, but at the same time it does not share many European policies and choices and sees the EU as a trade opponent. Even in the past, economic and commercial competition between Europe and the United States has caused moments of disagreement and tension, which however have been managed within the framework of a strong common strategic interest and in the belief that we were not playing a zero-sum game, in which you can only gain what your opponent loses.
EU suspended between Washington and Moscow
A difficult to manage scenario is therefore emerging, where Europe must base its security on the support of an indispensable ally, but which would welcome its economic and institutional weakening. At the same time, Europe is also being pushed to start a serious political dialogue with Russia for reasons of geographical proximity, of energy security and due to the need to reduce and manage the too many crises open along its eastern and southern borders, but has to deal with the nationalistic ambitions by Vladimir Putin. A navigation between Scylla and Charybdis.
However, coexisting with Trump's USA, although neither easy nor comfortable, is certainly possible and could even be resolved positively, if it helped the EU to strengthen its defenses and to pursue one's own unity with greater determination. On the other hand, it is more difficult to find a way to defend oneself from Putin's Russia without cutting the bridges of the necessary dialogue and without renouncing the potential advantages of certain convergences (against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, border instability, etc.).
Is it possible to consider Putin's obvious re-election to the presidency as an opportunity, as well as a challenge? The answer will depend on the European ability to convince the Russian president that Ukraine, and others ex-Soviet European republics, are more useful to Moscow as buffer states, open to both sides, than as victims of a costly re-annexation process whose final results are more than dubious.
Along these lines, it might be possible to remove at least part of the sanctions imposed on Russia, those not directly linked to the annexation of Crimea, and to favor important investments in the ex-Soviet republics that could also profit Moscow. Putin may be interested in reducing the pressures currently driving him to increase his military vigilance throughout the former Soviet area.
New substance to arms control
This also applies outside Europe. After all, the economic and human cost of the Russian intervention in Syria it is rapidly increasing, while its benefits are declining, due to Bashar al Assad's determination to take advantage of the dissensions in the coalition to continue his attempt to reconquer the country. In this way the illusion of being able to end the conflict with an armistice organized around a series of different spheres of influence headed by the various members of the coalition vanishes, and the war continues.
Nor can Russia look without concern to the eventuality of a war, direct or indirect, with theIran involving part of the Arab world and Israel. A common European position open to the possibility of recognizing some convergences and working out some compromises could make the difference.
At the same time, Europeans are interested in pursuing a close dialogue with Washington so that conventional and nuclear arms control policy is given new substance, before the Inf. Treaty or that SALT III expires. For the conventional, the initiative can start fromOSCE (Italian presidency this year), but nuclear power requires a bilateral approach between Moscow and Washington. Europeans could contribute by elaborating proposals in related areas of great strategic interest, both conventional and nuclear, such as cyber security or that of assets in outer space.
None of this will be easy, but Europe's security requires a determined attempt to reduce from the outset the risks of a new anomalous Cold War, the consequences of which would be paid dearly in the first place by Europe.
