Everything went according to script: the usual accusations of fraud (this time also documented by the webcams in the polling stations), the inevitable raid by the feminists of the Ukrainian association Femen, and, above all, the announced winner: Vladimir Putin has had his hands on Russia continuously since 2000. Until 2008 as president, then, left the scepter to the dauphin Medvedev, as prime minister, and from today again as head of state after collecting 63,75% of the votes (down from 71% in 2004, but still 45,1 million votes, even more than expected by the exit polls).
The only off-program of the discounted triumph, the moved tears of the protagonist: when Putin showed up in Moscow's Manege Square in the evening to announce victory to the thousands of supporters who invoked him, he showed a new side of himself. The only one: all the rest is unfortunately known history, hackneyed accusations, endless suspicions. Starting with the factor that most worries the international community: the credibility of this latest plebiscite and the state of health of democracy in Russia, a country of 144 million inhabitants spread over six time zones, for some time now considered one of the famous "Brics", i.e. the countries in the world with the highest growth rate and potential. And the numbers confirm it: exploiting in particular the export of raw materials (oil alone accounts for 60% of exports), the GDP in 2011 still grew by 4,2%, and the public debt ratio is contained at 12%, one of the lowest in the world. Not only that: in 2012 the Moscow Stock Exchange is the queen of the world (+24%) and for the current year the growth of the gross product is confirmed at +3,9%, registering a recovery of industrial production as well, historically held back by imports.
Not bad for a country that in 1999, in the last year of the Yeltsin era, it was on the verge of bankruptcy and took note of inflation that was traveling at 37% per annum. Not that the merits are all Putin's, but more than anything else the explosion in oil prices: so much so that in 2009, when fuel prices collapsed, the Russian economy dropped by 7%, not on a par with what has been done by other emerging countries, which by virtue of more diversified systems have not at all interrupted their unbridled race towards enrichment.
However, the commodity boom contributed to the emancipation of the middle class in and around Moscow: between 99 and 2007 consumption grew by 15%, and consequently also imports, which increased fivefold in the same period. Furthermore, while confirming that most of the wealth remains firmly in the hands of the oligarchies, the percentage of poverty has decreased: from 20% in 2003 to 16% in 2011.
But not all that glitters is gold. Or rather, it is not written anywhere that in the name of all this, of the markets or of the so-called realpolitik, democracy is put on the back burner. First of all, Putin's electoral campaign was drugged by particularly restrictive rules, which would make the inventor of Porcellum cry out in the scandal: two million signatures to be collected just to stand for elections (if there are no seats in Parliament, where the barrier is 7% and where electoral signs are practically prohibited). And provided that the candidate is not too unwelcome to Wladimir, as he teaches the case of the oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a fierce critic of the Kremlin in prison since 2003 and for whom Medvedev – after the elections and the risk of having him as an opponent, one could say – ordered the Prosecutor's Office to reopen the case.
Apart from the legitimacy of "asking" an initiative from the judiciary, which should be independent, this story is just one of many that casts a shadow on the modus operandi of the award-winning Putin-Medvedev firm: settling accounts, cover-ups, and then "leaps" openness towards the opposition, in this case satisfied only to appease the protests after the controversial legislative elections of 4 December. Not to mention freedom of the press, which remains more than a chimera in Russia: the outgoing prime minister was unable to campaign in the squares for fear of booing, but raged on TV, where the news of all channels gave space to propaganda without respecting any rule of a level playing field.
It is true that in big cities, Moscow in primis, through the web, popular dissent has made itself felt quite a bit (even if only since mid-December) and has organized events that have also had prominence abroad, but it is also true that 70% of Russians live far from the capital and other major cities, and is therefore only accessible through television. Not to mention the fact that geographical isolation certainly doesn't help media control over possible fraud: just think that in Chechnya the percentages in favor of Putin and his United Russia party are always suspiciously Bulgarian (over 90%). On freedom of the press there is also the pitiful veil of the chilling - and unpunished - series of murders against journalists who opposed the regime, especially those investigating the war in Chechnya. There are more than 100 suspicious deaths in all: the last is Anastasia Baburova of Novaya Gazeta, while the first, in 2000 in Georgia, was the Italian Antonio Russo of Radio Radicale.
And how does the international community intend to react to all this? "There was no real competition and the abuse of government resources ensured that the winner of the election was never in doubt," they state in a no-nonsense statement. observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Indignation and concern then arrive unanimously from all the international press, even if the most interesting analysis is that of Financial Times: “What is clear – writes the financial daily – is that Putin's popularity is on the wane. Rigging aside, pre-election polls have suggested the president now enjoys less than 50% support in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the country's political capitals. His base remains strong only in the countryside, but disillusionment is creeping there too.”
“Discontent – continues FT – is not cheap. Russians are living much better today than they were when Putin became president 12 years ago, thanks to skyrocketing oil prices, and the working class has benefited, and is therefore less inclined to take to the streets”. However, the danger comes from the middle class, so enriched, but "concerned by rampant corruption, cronyism, lack of representation and legal protection". "The increase in the standard of living - observes FT -, which once anesthetized the Russians in the face of the negative aspects, is now gradually losing its effects".
For the English financial newspaper the most probable scenarios are two: that the newly elected president satisfy the middle class, however irritating the oligarchies that have always supported him and risking that the latter promote alternative figures of reference; or, more likely according to FT, that the Kremlin immediately plans a post-election crackdown against the opposition and gains popularity through an unholy public spending policy that would jeopardize the country's fiscal stability.
E the West? According to the Financial Times, "it must draw a fine line, enticing Russia to be a responsible member of the international community. Without interfering, he must do everything possible to help ensure that the Putin era ends not in disorder, but with a smooth transition to a more democratic phase, based on new rules for the future."
