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Corporate premium tax relief: opportunities for non-self-sufficiency policies

With collective policies, it would be enough for a 40-year-old employee to pay 170 euros a year to obtain, in the event of non-self-sufficiency, a monthly annuity of 900 euros, with a reduction in the pension annuity of 11 euros

The complete tax relief of the productivity bonus, provided for by the 2017 Budget law, where it is used in welfare goods and services, represents an opportunity both for companies and, above all, for employees. In particular, according to Assoprevidenza, the field can finally be opened up to the diffusion of long-term care (LTC) insurance coverage, which guarantees an annuity when people become non-self-sufficient, a situation which, today, is economically burdensome for a large part of Italian families assist their loved ones in old age.

“In a country that is aging more than any other in Europe - observes Sergio Corbello, President of Assoprevidenza - the issue of LTC coverage can no longer be ignored: it is a matter of ensuring peace of mind in old age for people who become non self-sufficient. A hypothesis of compulsory coverage can now also be taken into consideration, following the example of what has already been done in Germany for many years. Taking into account the related tax benefits, the diffusion of coverage to the entire population would allow the result to be pursued with truly negligible costs ”.

In the Assoprevidenza workshop, carried out in collaboration with Percorsi di Secondo Welfare and Itinerari Previdenziali, the effects of the application to LTC coverage of the new technical calculation bases prepared by ANIA, the association of insurance companies, were presented. collaboration with La Sapienza University. The simulations developed by Tiziana Tafaro – Studio Attuariale Orru & Associati – and by Giulia Mallone – Percorsi di Secondo Welfare – relating to the use of the performance bonus to finance coverage, confirm the advantages for workers and for the social system.

When an employee chooses to convert the performance bonus into welfare benefits, the company saves social security contributions. For the worker, the calculation of convenience is slightly more complex: he has an immediate income, because he can dispose of the entire gross amount of the premium, but in the future he will lose something on his pension, because INPS contributions are not paid on that sum. The study tries to provide a quantification of the costs/benefits of this choice.

The calculation was carried out assuming two different hypotheses: hypotheses currently in use on the market (Hypothesis A) and new ANIA technical bases on LTC and serious illnesses (Hypothesis B) prepared by ANIA. The contribution by the worker is significantly different if calculated on the basis of the current situation or according to the new technical bases: in the first case a 40-year-old worker must pay 1.000 euros a year for LTC insurance, in the second case only 170 EUR. With regard to the effect on future retirement, if today's forty-year-old retires at the age of 68 with a pension of 2.400 euros for 13 months, in the first case he would see his monthly pension allowance reduced by 64 euros, in the second case only by 11 EUR. In both cases, any non-self-sufficiency would result in a further annuity of 900 euros per month (out of 12 months).

Also from the point of view of the cost/benefit ratio, the allocation of the productivity bonus to the financing of non-self-sufficiency coverage proves to be a choice certainly to be considered, since in the face of certainly contained losses of the basic pension it is possible to obtain, in the event of non-self-sufficiency self-sufficiency, an annuity 10 times higher. The greatest criticality of the solutions proposed in Rome is the current marginalization of the "collectivization" of risk: in the simulations, the costs of LTC coverage, in fact, were calculated on the basis of a collective subscription hypothesis, therefore mandatory for all members of the audience subject to insurance; individual coverage would inevitably present much higher charges. The new rules explicitly refer to the worker's right to choose the method of disbursement of the bonus amount, whether in cash or welfare.

However, it remains to be clarified whether second-level bargaining has the right to derogate from this provision by setting up collective welfare systems. If it is true that the proposed solution "offloads" the burden of assistance onto the shoulders of the individual worker, who would find himself financing coverage against the risk of non-self-sufficiency with his performance bonus, we know how in Italy this risk already falls today mainly on families, since it is not adequately covered by the public welfare system. In this way, the worker could ensure his own future without fear of weighing on his loved ones in the future, thus obtaining additional coverage with respect to the pension income.

“What is needed for an evolution of coverage strategies for non-self-sufficiency? – adds Edoardo Zaccardi of the Social Security Itineraries Study Center – I am thinking first of all of a real political will to face the issue head-on, of a cultural leap, which leads to an awareness of the need for LTC coverage in the light of the radical socio-demographic changes that have taken place . At the same time it is necessary to address a material dimension relating to costs. As demonstrated by the study presented during the workshop, these are destined to be further reduced, thus also facilitating the cultural leap. What is missing at this point is only politics ”.

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