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From the euro to austerity: the 33 false truths about Europe according to Bini Smaghi

The European elections are upon us and the former member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, publishes a book with "Il Mulino" to debunk the clichés about Europe: "All evils are too often blamed to the EU institutions: but where were the politicians in the last 30 years?” – How crazy the idea of ​​leaving the euro is

From the euro to austerity: the 33 false truths about Europe according to Bini Smaghi

The external enemy, the conspiracy of rich and powerful states, the search for the scapegoat to explain the failures are a constant of our politicians (but often also of those of other countries, especially if in authoritarian regimes). Today in Italy these excuses are ridden both by the parties which in past years have had direct responsibilities in determining the current crisis, both by opposition movements such as the 5 stars, and finally by the usual free thinkers of the extreme left always ready to seek the equality through the general impoverishment of even those who are a little above the survival threshold. This is leading to a dangerous detachment from reality by a growing percentage of Italians who unload the responsibility for the dramatic recession we have been experiencing for over five years on Europe, the Euro and the Germans. With the only result of further delaying the adoption of the correct measures to get back in step with Europe and with the world, and return to an adequate growth rate.

Finally, a robust reaction is beginning to take shape on the part of experts and politicians who reject the demagogic alibis and identify a possible way to hook up the recovery by putting the great sacrifices already made to good use. In this sense, the new book by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, former member of the Executive Committee of the ECB, ("33 false truths about Europe" published by Il Mulino) is particularly significant, which manages in simple terms to counter the most frequent assertions made to try to discharge one's responsibilities or to indicate simplistic shortcuts to revive the country's fortunes, as Grillo does, however ending up in practice by not being able to do anything other than a sterile protest.

Bini Smaghi addresses all the most widespread clichés demonstrating that they constitute fallacious recipes which, instead of getting us out of the disease, would aggravate our ailments, because in the event of an electoral victory they would demonstrate to international investors that Italy is struggling to accept the cure right and keep looking for illusory shortcuts. The first and most important affirmation by many sorcerer's apprentices (from the Lega to Grillo, passing through the Brothers of Italy) is that by leaving the Euro we could devalue and therefore our economy would start growing healthy and robust again without having to do any of the structural reforms that everyone points out to us as indispensable. With few statistical data, but reading them correctly, Bini Smaghi demonstrates that our exports have been suffering for over a decade due to the loss of competitiveness which has not allowed us to take advantage of the tumultuous development of non-European countries, as both Germany and Germany have done that Spain, while our interchange within the Euro area has not suffered particularly as there has been no invasion of German or French products. On the other hand, the foreign demand for developed countries does not depend only on the price, but on the technological content of the exported products and on the quality of the services. Staying out of the Euro would mean having higher inflation, high interest rates and therefore a further obstacle to the recovery of investments.

Does the Euro penalize weak countries for the benefit of stronger ones? Apart from the fact that for the first four years after the introduction of the single currency Germany was a weak country which grew even less than Italy, it is evident that the strength of a country depends on its competitiveness and that this derives primarily from cost of labour, which must not grow more than productivity, by maintaining an energy cost in line with that of competitors, by liberalization in the service sector to undermine the monopolies which keep the prices of their services artificially high, by the public administration whose inefficiencies are paid for with high taxation, from justice, from corruption, from security that must create an environment suitable for economic operators. If Italy has lost twenty points of competitiveness compared to Germany in the last 15 years, what does Europe have to do with it?

At work, the numbers pitted by Bini Smaghi fear no denials. Since 2000, wage growth in Germany has been 1% annually while in Italy it has stood at 3%, and productivity has grown in Germany at a higher rate, while it has been around zero in Italy. This is the result of a rigid labor market and the refusal of the trade unions but also of Confindustria to move bargaining to the company level, where the relationship between wages and productivity is best seen.

Other than a conspiracy denounced by former minister Tremonti! In a final note, Bini Smaghi recounts the events of 2011, how and when Italy almost defaulted and the fall of the Berlusconi government came about, confirming that it was the Government's incapacity that undermined the markets' confidence, and how the attempt to bailout of the ECB was frustrated by the non-compliance with the commitments, due to the internal quarrels of the majority.

A truly useful book for its ease of reading that even television presenters can understand. A book that warns Italians inviting them to get out of the dream of miraculous solutions to carefully evaluate what has already been done and the steps that are now being taken to reform the institutions and to overcome bureaucratic obstacles. Of course this does not mean that Europe and the Euro are perfect constructions. But after all, not even the FED in the United States was, so much so that after the outbreak of the crisis profound changes were made to the supervision and control of bank assets. But you cannot ask others to do things that are in our exclusive competence, such as the abolition of the Senate or the reform of our rambling regionalism. It is necessary to act by giving ourselves very ambitious but achievable objectives, by ceasing to feel sorry for the suffering imposed on us by others, when it is only we who possess the keys to get out of the cul de sac in which we have driven ourselves due to a mixture of bad faith and of incompetence.


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