To the new government headed by Mario Monti they are asked to get out of the crisis, and if possible quickly. But how did we get to this situation? And above all, how will it be possible to solve it now?
To analyze it is the ERC, European Research Centre, which above all underlines the heavy legacy left by the centre-right government. In June 2008 Tremonti proudly announced that he had put the public finances in order. And three and a half years later, instead?
In 2009, industrial production and consequently the GDP literally plummeted: industrial production even at -25% compared to the base value of 2007, the GDP down by 4-5%. 2010 was the year of recovery, especially in manufacturing, driven by exports, while GDP has always remained essentially stationary.
The forecasts for 2011 are again negative: the gross domestic product sees the “minus” sign reappear (-0,5% according to the Cer), while industry suffers again in the last quarter. And the forecasts of the Cer for the following years are not encouraging, especially 2012, which will be the black year: GDP, consumption, investments and inventories in decline. Only the usual exports will be saved, but well below their potential.
But not only: the government leaves with a spread between Italian and German government bonds of more than 500 basis points, despite the fact that corrective measures for over 117 billion were adopted during the legislature. The problem therefore lies in the trust of the markets, which look not only at numbers but also at credibility: operators do not believe the announcements and impose an additional effort to actually reach them. Not satisfied with the "accounting" of budget balance, but need to combine fiscal rigor with growth-relaunch strategies, completely absent in the Italian political and legislative landscape.
So what should Monti do? Let's take for example the crisis of 1992, with the caretaker government of Giuliano Amato. Then a corrective maneuver of "tears and blood" was necessary, because public finance was in shambles.
The situation is different now, for a number of reasons:
- first of all there are already almost 118 billion existing corrective measures, which only needs to be implemented, without wasting time and power games;
- the country's institutional and international credibility must be re-established, a necessary condition to reduce the differential between our BTPs and the German Bunds. Only in this way is it possible to give effectiveness to the measures already taken, which otherwise would be thwarted by the higher interest expense;
– hire a attitude in Europe of solidarity and mutual protection, because the punishments inflicted on the "guilty" have counterproductive results throughout the eurozone. Suffice it to say that Germany itself, the first economy in the euro area, is credited with a 2012 growth of only +0,8%, against 3% in 2011 and 3,7 in 2010.
Therefore, above all rigor, credibility, and reduction of the spread. But then, also growth. The measures adopted so far have only been of a restrictive nature, with these depressive effects: increase in the tax burden (which reached 44,9% in 2013, +2,3 points on 2010), reduction in the real disposable income of households (- 2,2%), contraction of public investments (-37% in 2014).
Instead, here are what the recipes for growth would be, according to the Cer:
- reduce underemployment of women, young people and the elderly;
- reduce the tax burden on labour, restoring competitiveness to businesses;
– provide fiscal incentives for the activity of business investment;
– streamline the reconversion of production systems (i.e.: social shock absorbers);
– recover the function of public demand as a driving force for new entrepreneurial activities.
The strategy is complex, the task of Mario Monti and his ministers difficult, but this will have to allow our country to regain the place it deserves in Europe, as Founding country and third largest economy in the area.
