Following the sixth nuclear test carried out by North Korea on 3 September, analyzes and comments have focused on the reactions of the actors involved: above all the United States, China and Russia. In this climate of tension, South Korea demonstrates that it distances itself from the alarmism that holds sway in the international community.
When South Korean voters were called to the polls last May, following the corruption scandal of former President Park, the liberal policies and the proposals for peaceful dialogue with North Korea were rewarded with the victory of Moon Jae-in , the liberal candidate. The more than 40% of the votes obtained demonstrate the clear will of the population to favor a peaceful attitude in the resolution of the hostilities that continue to characterize the Korean peninsula.
However, recent nuclear developments, proudly flaunted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, are putting Moon's initial diplomatic intentions to the test. South Korea is, in fact, entering a phase in which the dynamics of national and international politics are at the origin of new initiatives in terms of defense and security.
Moon abandons Sunshine Policy 2.0
The missile launches and the recent nuclear test, which took place in a space of just four months, have certainly changed the cards on the table, and President Moon's position has not been slow to adapt to the new circumstances by opting for an about-turn on the initial reconciliation strategy – the so-called Sunshine Policy. Sunshine Policy 2.0 – Moon's proposed updated version of the détente initially pursued and implemented by his equally progressive predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun – hasn't even had time to get started it's already been put aside to make room for increasingly insistent requests for sanctions against the Pyongyang regime and for new agreements for a military strengthening of Seoul.
This is how the apparent tranquility of the South Korean population opposes Moon's requests to increase the defense budget up to 39 billion dollars (up to 2.9% of South Korean GDP), to complete the installation of the Thaad missile shield , and to start the production of nuclear submarines.
The nuclear crisis does not scare citizens
Since the last electoral campaign, the proposals in the economic sphere have proved to be decisive in the outcome of the elections and priority in the interests of the citizens. Contrary to expectations, this trend has remained unchanged despite the constant provocations of the Pyongyang regime.
Walking through the streets of Seoul, an apparent calm emerges towards what is happening a few hundred kilometers from here, in stark contrast with the attitude that emerges from the countless articles published by national newspapers and from the anguish of the international community regarding the future of the peninsula.
When it would be normal to expect to hear conversations about the possible catastrophic outcomes of what now appears to be a duel between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, South Koreans show instead that they are more concerned about the current unemployment rate (and supplies stocks in view of the upcoming holidays, during which many shops will be closed).
If faced with the hypothesis of a possible escalation of tensions, the answer that South Korean citizens prefer to give can easily be translated as "so what?". The prospect of fresh winds of war on the Korean peninsula does not seem to represent a real concern in the everyday life of South Korean citizens, who have no intention of being subdued by fear of what the rest of the world regards as a crisis that needs immediate solutions , but to which at these latitudes they prove to be accustomed.
It is a reaction that finds its reasons in the history of the country. The citizens of South Korea, in fact, base their convictions on the lessons of experience: in recent decades, Pyongyang has made itself the author of threats ultimately aimed at attracting the attention of international powers and satisfying the momentary interests of the Kim family, rather than unleashing a conflict that would undermine the very survival of the ruling dynasty.
Possible evolutions
Following this interpretation of the facts, the theory that seems to gather the most consensus is the one that rules out an imminent armed conflict, and that explains the current international crisis as a series of attempts by the US and North Korean governments to understand how far they can go in mutual provocations.
Trump appears to be the real element of instability in what, in the eyes of the South Koreans, is a coherent realization of the ambitions of the Kims. If so far North Korea's actions found a response in the diplomatic efforts of previous American administrations, Trump's tweets are now the real novelty in this process of recalibration of relations between North Korea and the United States.
From now on, what can be expected is a South Korean government increasingly determined to strengthen its military arsenal, not so much in reaction to recent nuclear developments on the peninsula as as a result of an American ally perceived to be increasingly uninterested in providing a of reliable and constant defense to their allies.
The concept of America First is thus positioned at the basis of a renewed desire for militarization which, although difficult to achieve, is gradually becoming part of the priorities of East Asian countries.
