It is, that of Cop28, un “historic agreement” as he triumphantly commented Sultan Al Jaber? And how to interpret that transition away (way out) come on fossil fuels which replaced the more radical phase out (“elimination” but also, less drastically, “progressive elimination”)? And is it a step forward compared to the phase out of only unabated fossils (i.e. those for which there are no technologies that capture their emissions) indicated by the G7 last April? The exegetes of international agreements have something to indulge themselves with.
The positive results of Cop28
The glass can be seen as half full. The first notable result is that in an international (political, in this case) climate in which multilateralism is evidently in crisis, the fight against climate change remains the terrain, perhaps the only one, where developed countries and undeveloped countries, democratic countries and countries led by authoritarian regimes, countries endowed with energy resources and countries without them, continue to talk to each other. First of all China and the United States. This is a great achievement. Furthermore, it keeps alive in the international community the feeling, however weak, always threatened, that we are linked by a common destiny and that that fate also depends on the actions of governments and their diplomacies.
Also attention to nuclear power, whose capacity is hoped to be tripled by 2050, marks an interesting turning point: we will see if it represents a first step towards changing the orientation of public opinion in many countries which, thanks also to a very biased media campaign and the legacies of a widespread activism years ago rejects the use of this non-polluting source.
Cop28: the critical points of'aI agree
But there is no shortage of critical points. First, once again, the principle of accountability on what individual countries implement to combat climate change: COPs remain longer the location of the announcements rather than the place where individual countries report their policies to the international community. On the other hand, climate policies influence energy policies and these, in turn, influence development and national security. There just doesn't seem like a time when individual countries can agree to expose yourself to judgment of the international community.
But perhaps the biggest omission is the absence of clear commitments by rich countries help the poorest countries in the energy transition and replacement of fossil fuels by mid-century. According to United Nations estimates, developing countries will need at least six trillion dollars in financing by 2030 to achieve this goal. The new COP agreement vaguely mentions that mountain of money without going into detail about it who will pay and for what. And the problem is not just the adequacy of the sums involved: the fundamental issue of climate finance which often comes into competition with the other needs of the developing countries that these transfers are supposed to serve. Much climate finance is displacing traditional development aid, and if track record is any indicator of future behavior, a large share of the funds will be drawn from budgets that finance other developing country priorities, such as health, education, women's rights, infrastructure construction and humanitarian aid.
What remains, as an interpretative key to the COP meetings, is the historic contrast between countries that want to continue to grow at a rapid pace - mostly without energy resources - and countries that have already reached high levels of development.
COP28: gradualness as a guiding principle of the transition
The history of decoupling – that is, that it is possible to combine growth and reduction of emissions – does not convince the poorest countries and perhaps rightly so: the transition means replacing sources with a high energy content (density and power) with sources with a lower content and finding new economic balances with renewable resources still appear to be an uncertain path. In particular, uncertainty concerns more energy-intensive production (those most necessary for countries that need to develop and build infrastructure) where the zero emissions objective can only be achieved towards 2060. From this point of view, Europe, which has also managed to decouple, is not a previous: the growth rate to which those countries aspire is much higher than the European one (and which some of them already achieve but which they want to maintain) and the type of development on which they must focus is very different (more on basic industries and less on services ).
In conclusion, in Dubai it is confirmed, beyond the declarations, gradualness as the guiding principle of the transition. Realistically, at this rate, the goal of net zero emissions for 2050 appears difficult to achieve. In the current international framework - which will probably remain in the coming years - a national policy (given that the European one is practically absent) that also focuses on adaptation to climate change would be more necessary than ever: a discussion that would deserve specific and more detailed reflections.
