It will take time to understand whether the proposal constitutional reform presented by the Meloni government is it just an identity flag for the next European elections or does it have a real chance of taking off. It is certainly a reform project that is off to an uphill start: not so much due to the widespread dissent of the opposition, of which no complete alternative proposal is known so far, but due to the confusion and contradictions with which the text is still dotted. Strengthen the Presidency of the Council in the name of stability is not heresy and neither is talking about premiership (which is always better than presidentialism), but it depends on how you do it. The watershed is certainly the direct election or otherwise of the prime minister, but there are other rules that accompany the premiership which sow doubts and uncertainties and which risk causing institutional short circuits. It is not certain that the reform will reach the finish line and it is not certain that the final text will really resemble the initial bill, but for now the result is the one illustrated to "Repubblica" by the former prime minister and former President of the Constitutional Court Julian Amato according to which the Casellati bill (named after the proposing minister) has the undeniable effect of "overturning the institutional system" by weakening the Parliament and taking away the authority of the Quirinal. It is not enough to say that the guarantee function of the President of the Republic it cannot be touched if one then imagines taking away from him the power to appoint the Prime Minister and the power to dissolve the Chambers.
Constitutional reform: the loose cannon of the new electoral law
But, in addition to the premiership, there is another aspect of the reform which has so far remained somewhat in the shadows, also because the text has not been finalised, but which risks becoming a loose cannon and is the new Electoral law which will have to accompany the premiership. Article 3 of the reform proposal hypothesizes a majority premium for the coalition that wins the elections that guarantees 55% of the seats in the Chambers to the lists and candidates linked to the Prime Minister elected by direct suffrage. But the most bizarre and disturbing thing is that the minimum threshold for obtaining the prize is not defined. Without precise and reasonable indications, it would be absurd for the coalition that gets even just 27 or 28% of the voters' votes to be able to make a move and take home 55% of the parliamentary seats. The definition of a reasonable threshold to trigger the majority bonus is not a detail but is another crucial step of the future electoral law which will tell us whether it serves to truly strengthen and renew Italian democracy or to take dangerous steps in the direction of a greater democracy but a democracy that Italians really don't feel the need for.
