Recently the large Italian company is the object of the wishes of the large financial and industrial groups of Russia and Asia. Companies from these countries are attracted by their technological potential, by the opportunity to have privileged access within the EU and by the possibility of mitigating the exchange rate risk deriving from the euro-dollar duopoly. Less interesting for Italy's economic growth should their entry have as objective their market position in the EU since the subsequent closure of the Italian manufacturing would often be inevitable.
Unfortunately this imported strategy is not accompanied by the birth in Italy of new innovative companies with a high technological content in which manufacturing and services are integrated. On the contrary, there is an exit of large Italian companies towards countries that have a less penalizing tax system and have cheaper interest rates because they are not influenced by state funding.
Early nineties, the Italian governments of the time did not consider the elaboration of an industrial strategy a priority and as justification they carried the Community veto on state aid and also the parcelling out of responsibilities between the state and local authorities and the alleged need to liberalize the Italian economy Indeed, the political class wanted to avoid conflicts with Big Business and Big Banks.
in 1992, the reform of the banking law of 1936 had contributed to the end of the IRI and had created the financial conditions to allow the Italian Finance to participate in the privatization of public companies operating in the services and endowed with considerable profits and cash flows (insurance, highways, information technology, defense, large retailers, etc.). The private Groups had concentrated on short-term profit and the search for rent, i.e. on oligopolistic sectors with little competition and subject to public control, direct or indirect, and therefore more easily influenced.
In TLC services, however, there were significant Italian and foreign appetites, but also great confusion and the need for huge capital to adapt to the disruptive dynamics of technical progress. The Treasury, responsible for privatizations, had focused its attention only on compliance with the rules (right) and speed of the process (a strategy that was not always efficient) but without considering industrial policy a priority in the selection of buyers. The consequence has been the loss of technological knowledge of the public sector and therefore of control over the evolution of technologies and entrepreneurial innovations due to the lack of skills and professionalism.
Unfortunately, in the last thirty years, Italian industry stood out negatively for: 1) insufficient investment in applied research; 2) the prevalence of finance over production (especially in the years of high interest rates); 3) the financial strategy aimed at managing working capital and in particular cash flow; 4) the industrial strategy mainly aimed at reducing costs through the deconstruction and relocation of phases of the production process.
The distribution of power within large groups it has not changed with the reduction in interest rates and despite the global financial crisis which should have prompted caution in the management of corporate finance. Furthermore, the heavy financial crises have accentuated the attention on the risk of bank default and therefore further heavy constraints have been imposed on the granting of credit, especially to SMEs, effectively hindering the financing of industrial initiatives and increasing the cost of money for few Italian companies that could finance themselves on foreign financial markets.
Recently, the Renzi government managed to change the expectations of foreign investors allowing them to access the levers of command in the historic steel and mechanical companies once in public hands, in the companies that own networks and basic industries, just to mention the situation in strategic sectors. Finally, the usual well-informed financiers insinuated that SAIPEM, one of the few Italian companies that has a dominant position in a strategic sector, could be put up for sale.
To defend a semblance of tricolor, the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) brokered huge financial resources between Italian savers, the State and businesses dutifully having, as a priority, the safeguarding of their investment and full responsibility towards the ECB. In doing so, CDP behaves like a saver who would not have the power to oppose the majority shareholder (Chinese, Russian, Indian, Japanese, etc.) should the latter decide to exit the business, having become passive, taking the treasure of relationships and knowledge connected to the productive activity developed in Italy.
The Italian government would not need the golden share to negotiate with foreign investors because the negative consequences of any incomer strategies would weigh on the Italian public budget. Recently, the Prime Minister declared that it is not up to the Government to define industrial policy, thus demonstrating a political-economic originality that Italy has rarely had and suggesting Pilate-like behavior towards a possible conflict between large Italian companies In the background there is the alleged assignment to ENEL of the task of carrying out the investment in the broadband network but it is not clear who had this power of decision. I believed that this assignment was part of the skills associated with the golden share, obviously I was wrong.
Renzi's affirmation and the silence of the minister for economic development demonstrate, if necessary, that there is no industrial strategy to support growth and as a point of reference for large and medium-sized Italian companies, provided that both decide to invest in Italy, even overcoming obstacles such as the aging of entrepreneurs. This is not the place to suggest an industrial policy which must be the result of a group of experts but some actions have been repeatedly referred to in recent years.
Among these, the best known intend to promote:
a) mergers in medium-sized enterprises, defending, however, the single command (an almost impossible mission with our entrepreneurs);
b) the growth of innovative SMEs and start-ups originating in companies, universities and research centers (easy to be born, difficult to grow in Italy.);
c) the networks of medium and small enterprises providing them with services based on knowledge and on ICT (difficult if the local conflicts present also in the districts are not overcome).
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that there is a headquarters that draws up an industrial policy to protect general public interests, without being conditioned by local political pressures and private interests. One solution could be the return to decision-making centers and medium- and long-term private financial institutions that are independent of large Italian groups and banks and are equipped with knowledge tools, powers, human resources and capital to finance public investments and private individuals in the medium and long term.
