While it is certain that populist parties are increasingly emerging on the European political scene, it is not clear what unites them. Whether it's movements, activists or political groups themselves, there is no general definition of populism capable of encompassing their different nuances.
As suggested by the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin, researchers or academics who try to define populism all fall into the theoretical paradox of Cinderella's slipper. Although their conceptual artifact seems perfect, every time you try to make it fit a party, it turns out to be too small or too big, just like the crystal slipper in the famous fairy tale.
Defining populism according to the modes of political action is not impossible. For example, all populist parties tend to simplify reality by providing unique answers to complex questions, divide society between honest citizens to protect and corrupt elites to fight, and seek their political legitimacy through almost absolute support for forms of direct democracy, in able to best express the will of the people.
However, populist parties have different narratives and may adopt one or more of the above courses of action. It should not be forgotten that even traditional parties can, very often for reasons of political expediency, adopt a populist dialectic or modus operandi.
EUROCRITICS AND EUROSCEPTICS
Beyond the classification developed by Tamás Boros, on how the European Union, the EU, is divided by an iron curtain between the north - dominated by right-wing populists - and the south, - the left - (the 5 Star Movement is beyond outside these schemes) the populist parties were also classified according to their more or less unfavorable inclination towards the EU.
Eurocritical populist parties argue for the need to reform, not destroy, the EU, while Eurosceptic parties are more likely to dismantle the union in order to reassert their national sovereignty. However, this same definition has been abused many times and parties that for their nature seem to be more anti-European they have sometimes called themselves Eurocritics or soft Eurosceptics to garner the support of more moderate voters.
POPULIST RESPONSES TO IMMIGRATION
However, even this last classification is not exhaustive. For a more reliable analysis, it is worth studying the positions of the main populist parties regarding common European policies.
The hot topics on which the populist parties' campaigns are gripping are the key ones for defining the EU's structure: migration and security policies, free intra-European movement and economic and monetary governance.
The migration crisis has been a strong propaganda tool used by several populist parties. In particular, the Party of Law and Justice (Pis) in Poland, the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary, both of which are in government, have repeatedly stated that their countries will not accept quotas of asylum seekers to be relocated, as decided by the European Commission.
For Pis, the problem is based on cultural incompatibility, which would not allow migrants, especially those from Muslim-majority countries, to integrate, but also on a question of national security, a position the latter is fully shared by Fidesz.
Although the French National Front and the Alternative for Germany together with the Northern League support a similar perspective, the latter, together with the 5 Star Movement, have also adopted forms of economic nationalism, stating that before providing for migrants, it is imperative tackle national situations of poverty.
Instead, populist parties such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece have adopted an inclusive rhetoric and declare themselves in favor of integration policies for migrants and asylum seekers.
At the same time, the Front National, the Alternative for Germany, Afd, but also the True Finns of Finland, the Dutch Freedom Party (Pvv) and the Austrian Freedom Party are not in favor of Schengen, while populist parties from from less economically strong member countries, both in the South and in the East, aim at the closure of the external borders, but at the maintenance of internal freedom of movement to ensure their citizens access to more promising job markets in other member countries.
In this sense, to provide a more realistic map of European populist tendencies, one must not only take into consideration the ideological division, which sees right-wing parties have a more accentuated nationalism, but also the differences relating to the socio-economic conditions of the countries of reference . For example, parties such as Pis and Fidesz define themselves as soft Eurosceptics precisely because of their support for intra-European freedom of movement and their nationalist and anti-European rhetoric clashes with the desire to remain members of the EU.
EURO AND POPULIST DILEMMA
A similar trend characterizes issues related to monetary and economic policies. For example, the Five Star Movement and the Northern League support a referendum on the euro. Similarly, the Front National, the Afd and the Pvv also declare themselves against the single currency. However, for Italy and France, the question of monetary sovereignty is linked to the possibility for the two countries to devalue their currency and prepare themselves, at least in the short term, for the economic crisis.
For the AfD and the Pvv however, the strengthening of the Eurozone is problematic because it weakens national sovereignty. Indeed, especially in the case of Germany, the single currency has ensured more competitiveness, greater exports and easier access to the markets of the member countries. For this reason, the AfD is less vocal in declaring its intent to get its country out of the euro. Instead, he is convinced that Greece should be forced out in order to safeguard the German national economy.
Podemos and Syriza, on the other hand, aim for greater coordination of economic and monetary policies to reflect social needs. In reality, this last point is also supported by the 5 Stars who have repeatedly declared the need to introduce a basic income in Italy on the model already adopted by various member countries.
Beyond political ideology, populisms in Europe are born and are fueled by what is perceived as a lack of European response to the needs of its citizens who feel betrayed by traditional political parties, unable to guarantee security and a fair redistribution of welfare.
Reducing the division of populist parties between Eurosceptics and Eurocritics can facilitate a macro categorization, but in fact it does not help to identify the instances represented by each of these parties, on the basis of which the EU and the traditional parties must build counter- credible answers.
