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Cassese: “Autonomy? This is secessionism. Spending will grow

INTERVIEW with SABINO CASSESE, constitutionalist and great public administration expert who focuses on the weak points of the reform on differentiated autonomy - "Those who scream forget that the State-Regions negotiation took place in the dark" - "With more competences they risk succumbing even the best-administered Regions” – “Today the powers go to the supranational level: there is no point in moving in the opposite direction”

Cassese: “Autonomy? This is secessionism. Spending will grow

The request by Veneto and Lombardy, which Emilia-Romagna has unfortunately followed, for differentiated autonomy raises various questions both of a legal-constitutional nature, and under the financial and economic-administrative aspect and finally under the political profile on the residual role of the central government and national political parties. We talk about it, in this interview with FIRSTcourses with Sabino Cassese, judge emeritus of the Constitutional Court, former minister and great expert in public administration. His analysis touches on all the "hot" topics of the project under discussion: from the lack of transparency, to the impact on public finances and State-Regions relations, to the contradictions between the announced benefits and the actual consequences of the proposal. Let us first look at the constitutional aspects.

Professor Cassese, what do you think of the reform of Title V made by the centre-left government in 2001? What interpretation should be given to Article 116?

“Let's first talk about the method, the procedure. The Constitution requires that the law of the State proceed "on the basis" of an agreement between the State and the region. Therefore, the decision is parliamentary and Parliament must not just ratify, as some claim. Let us not forget that this is substantially a constitutional change, moreover a singular one, i.e. relating to individual regions.

Then, there is the substance. The constitutional model of the region, unfortunately already betrayed in this half century of application, envisages the regional body as a planning body. The constituents did not want a fourth bureaucracy to develop alongside the state, parastatal and local bureaucracies. Instead, here we are dealing with personnel, finance, offices, that is, management and administration. In short, there is a betrayal of the constitutional model.

Finally, there is the issue of transparency. Anyone who screams and paws doesn't realize that the negotiations took place behind closed doors, in the dark, that there was no official communication of the texts being negotiated”.

Has the current functioning of the regions, including those with special statutes, been satisfactory, in the sense that they have ensured greater efficiency of the public machine? From an economic point of view, would there be an advantage for national companies or would there be the risk of multiplying regulations, for example on the environment, on transport, on labour, so as to create further obstacles for companies?

“The regional performance was very different. But the more virtuous regions have not managed to establish "best practices" and to have them affirmed, to have them followed by the other regions, nor has the State succeeded in this, which has indeed left the relationships for a long time in the hands of the Constitutional Court, which has intrinsic limits in its action".

Although the northern regions argue that autonomy would not involve a shift of resources, some technicians, such as prof. Giannola have shown that historical spending actually benefits the northern regions to the detriment of those in the south. Even the concept of fiscal residue on which much of the propaganda of the Northern League is based is in fact contested both from a legal and an accounting point of view . What is your opinion?

“The request for differentiated autonomy started off on the wrong foot, with the issue of the tax residue: it gives me the income received in the region. This is an inherently secessionist principle. Do you think that the real act of foundation of the new Italian state, in 1861, was the taking over of the debts of the pre-unification states”.

It is not just a question of the poor South against the rich and selfish North, it is a profound institutional revolution: how could a country with a weak central government and omnipotent regions function? And wouldn't political power be too concentrated in the hands of regional governors who will administer a large part of the resources with which to obtain consensus? What would remain of the national parties?

“There is a problem that comes first: while today all the powers go to supranational levels, can we think of going down a road in the opposite direction? Then comes the problem of programs: differentiated autonomy for what to do? Differentiated autonomy only for some regions or for all? If you go the latter route, what does more differentiation mean? Finally, while some functions are decentralized, it would not be necessary to re-centralise others, starting with health care, where the regional fragmentation of the Health Service (which is still called national today) has given rise to many different realities, precisely those which paradoxically the president of Veneto invokes every day as a motivation for differentiation. Add many bad performances, such as the abuse of the spoils system at the regional level. Finally, there is the general problem: already today the public outside the state is larger than the public inside the state. Already today the regions are burdened: a further transfer of administrative tasks runs the risk of making even the best administered regions succumb ".

If we add to this the other institutional reforms under discussion, such as the reduction in the number of parliamentarians which excessively penalizes representation without however ensuring governance, or the reform of the referendums which would reduce Parliament to an organ of academic debates, it does not seem to you that the premises are being created for a complete disintegration of the liberal representative democracy in which for better or worse we have lived since the Second World War, to arrive at the birth of a leader regime based on the direct relationship of the leader with the people, skipping all intermediate bodies , eliminating the independent authorities and even the judiciary (on which the current leaders have often said that the magistrates, not being elected, cannot go against the representatives of the people) .

“That's not what worries me, because it could be said that democracy is transferred to the regional level. It worries that an objective that can be shared and foreseen by the Constitution has been pursued incorrectly, in the wrong direction. This direction does not unload the state, but overloads it. One of the texts circulating as a result of the pre-agreements provides that personnel transferred to the regions can opt to stay or return to the state within three years. In this way, a cost is passed on to the state, because those who remain in the central ranks will not have a task that has been transferred to the region, and it will not be clear whether it can be "recycled". In short, the reform - carried out in this approximate way - will end up unloading other expenses on the State, allowing regional hirings from scratch".

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