The thesis supported by Stefano Fassina a few days ago in the Foglio, for what little my opinion is worth, is not convincing. It lacks realism. Which is an ancient pathology of the idealist left, an impediment to reformist cultures and policies. At issue is not “the awareness that we are on a path of self-destructive austerity”. A position which, apart from the rhetorical emphasis, has full legitimacy in terms of economic analysis: there are no demand drivers, argues Fassina. It is the thesis of Krugman who wrote "A Manifesto for Economic Sense", cited precisely by the economic manager of the PD. And the recent study by the Monetary Fund on the underestimation of the recessionary effects of fiscal stabilizations brings authoritative empirical evidence to this thesis. Moreover, it would seem difficult to deny that if Italy is at this point, if we have been growing less than Europe for more than ten years, it is not only a question of demand but of the very numerous supply bottlenecks (dualism of the labor market , inefficiency of justice, plethoric bureaucracy and poor public services, widespread defects of competition and good regulation). Bottlenecks that the government has started to remove, finding many obstacles.
But that's not the point. The point is that one cannot fail to start from a fact: the genetic defect of the construction of the monetary union ("a currency without a state") and the weak European government, with its political-institutional minuets of these four years of crises, which push the markets to seek profit in speculation on sovereign debts. Given this pathological situation of the Union – in conception and management – it is not difficult to imagine the reaction of investors in the face of an idiosyncratic national government compared to the mainstream, to the austere-recessive berlin consensus. Fassina is aware of this risk and in fact evokes "the determination to build together with the other progressive European governments, without self-defeating unilateral acts, the consensus to change course". But which other progressive governments? The historic French resistance to the loss of national sovereignty, completely independent of the color of the Presidents and governments, does not make that country a partner for changes of course. And in Germany, the SPD candidate for chancellery, Steinbruck, was finance minister in Merkel's grand coalition government; and a grand coalition government, with very subtle policy shifts, is the most likely outcome of the next elections. But even if the Social Democrats win and there is a red-green government with the adoption of a more expansive policy, the first requirement would still be missing: a strong European government capable of reassuring the markets. On the contrary, these would look with even greater suspicion on growing sovereign debts or, worse, on the birth of a Union debt without fiscal union. A generalized increase in interest rates would not be unlikely and the prospects of exiting the stagnation would be even more distant. Bitter stabilization medicine is the only viable national policy until the EU's economic policy is changed. A message that does not warm the hearts of the voters, that does not wave the red flags, which, above all, does not quickly resolve the serious problems of large sections of the country.
The only way out must therefore be sought in Europe (redemption fund, fiscal union, unified banking supervision, new ECB statute), not in Rome. And herein lies the real strong point of the Monti agenda, which I think Fassina does not grasp: the authoritative – by culture, by experience, by credibility – pro-European policy of strengthening the Union, of treating its genetic diseases, carried out by premier in one year of government. History is not made with ifs: but I find it difficult to imagine the little progress in economic policy governance made by Europe in the last twelve months in the absence of Monti (and Draghi). This work – however not easy – of placing the Euro and the European Union on new foundations represents the real, indispensable political-institutional premise for economic recovery and is not yet concluded. For this reason, unlike what Fassina says, we are not in "another phase".
