It is difficult, if not impossible, to reflect in the midst of a storm on the effects that may derive from it; in fact, we are prey to different feelings, from fear to the frantic search for reactive forms that allow us to overcome the negative impact of what seems to overwhelm everything and everyone. This is the state of mind with which many European citizens faced the shocking news of the victory of the «leave» in the UK on the morning of June 24th. , the desire to research the profound reasons that may have led the British people to such a traumatic choice took over, not only for the English people, but for the entire Union; a choice that suddenly erases a decades-long political and socio-economic relationship between Great Britain and Europe and, at the same time, calls into question the very foundations of the EU. The astonishment - which was immediately accompanied by the respect due to a decision taken with the democratic method - translated into the concern caused by the uncertainty of a future full of unknowns; hence the judgment expressed by numerous political scientists and economists who have defined the Brexit option as 'short-sighted', desired by 52% of the British and greeted with enthusiasm by European populist movements with extremist tendencies.
The results of the referendum show a Britain clearly divided internally - given the strong socio-cultural divide highlighted by the polarization of the electoral outcomes (see www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2016/jun/23/eu-referendum -live-results-and-analysis) – and undermined by the separatist demands of Scotland and Northern Ireland; in this context, the fact that London, one of the most international cities in the world, has been excluded from the Union project appears paradoxical. At the same time, a European reality emerges from them characterized by the need for an unavoidable acknowledgment of the limits of "neo-functionalism", suggested in the past by Jean Monnet (according to which the launch of processes of economic integration would overflow into forms of aggregation also of political value); acknowledgment that also invests the unsuccessful adoption of the comitological mechanism, based on an intergovernmental criterion, essentially intended to ensure the continuity (and not the overcoming) of national individualisms, hence the failure to achieve adequate forms of convergence.
This is the disheartening balance that emerges from the British vote of 23 June 2016! It is accompanied by an undeniable destabilizing effect which affects, in the first place, the economic and financial reality of the United Kingdom itself. And indeed, the intention to regain, with this referendum demonstration, an independence considered indispensable led the voters to be oblivious of the negative results which, in any case, would have resulted (ie impact on the levels of import/export and consequent reduction of the GDP, risk of downgrading of the debt outlook by rating agencies, downsizing of the financial center of London, foreseeable tariff increases, less attractiveness of English university centres, etc.). A similar situation of imbalance is found in the EU area, undermined not only by the danger of unfavorable economic and financial repercussions for some countries, but also by the threat of possible forms of contagion of this referendum trend to other Member States (see the editorial Brexit effect, Le Pen: "Exiting the European Union is now possible", published on www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/Brexit-Le-Pen-Uscire-da-Ue-ora-possibile); hence the start of a process destined to end, in all probability, in the implosion of the EU.
In a recent investigation into the causes of the current stagnation of the original project of the founding fathers of the European Community, I was keen to point out the particular position of Great Britain. The latter, in fact, must be counted among the European states which, more than others, have determined the conditions for a revision of the 'political design' of a "free and united Europe", hypothesized by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi to counter the totalitarianism prevailing in the 'old continent' during the Second World War (cf. Capriglione – Sacco Ginevri, Politics and Finance in the European Union. The Reasons for a Difficult Encounter, Wolter Kluver, 2016, p. 209 ss). This conclusion appeared to me to be consistent with the behavioral line of that country which – remaining outside the start-up phase of the Europe of «six» – concluded the negotiations for entry into the 'common market' only in 1973.
In order to fully evaluate the role of the United Kingdom within the EU, it must be borne in mind that - due to cultural characteristics and attitudes frequently held in the determination of European policies - it has often shown a sort of detachment from the rest of the continent or more exactly, the intention of not wanting to get fully involved in the events of a Europe whose reality is, perhaps, perceived as extraneous, excessively distant from the domestic one, which is instead considered a priority. This, despite having to recognize that this State, in the aftermath of the Second World War, was among the first European countries to recognize the need to proceed with a supranational constituent, aimed at achieving a gradual integration between them (cf. Churchill Commemoration 1996. Europe Fifty Years on: Constitutional, Economic and Political Aspects, edited by Thürer and Jennings, Zürich, Europa Institut-Wilton Park, Schultess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1997).
The long and animated political debate that developed in Great Britain in the second half of the twentieth century (and, in particular, the activity carried out by the conservative Harold MacMillan and the laborist Harold Wilson) on the issue of joining Europe (see for all toomey, Harold Wilson's EEC application: inside the Foreign Office 1964-7, University College Dublin Press, 2007), concluded in 1973 with the admission of Great Britain to the Community, demonstrates that the British choice for the latter (consecrated by a referendum) does not it takes place in a climate of great empathy, that is, such as to make political integration also considered necessarily connected to economic integration. The favor for full participation remains extremely limited over time, while the intent to benefit from community mechanisms based on intergovernmental methods prevails (see, among others, Charter, Au Revoir, Europe: What If Britain Left The EU?, London, 2012 ). A traditional attachment to national sovereignty (to be understood in its variegated components) is at the basis of a behavioral line which - although understandable due to the economic improvement pursued (exports, employment, etc.) - is decidedly contradictory, given the fierce opposition to European policies that are periodically raised in that country; significant, in this regard, already in the 70s were the disagreements of authoritative political exponents, such as Sir Teddy Taylor, who resigned as Minister in the Heath government as soon as he learned of the decision to sign the Treaties of Rome (cf. Cacopardi and others, Entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC.
In this context, Great Britain's failure to adhere to the "single currency" and its policy towards European affairs oriented, starting from 1992 (ie by the Maastricht Treaty), towards the protection of interests of a national nature, are placed. Therefore, the frequent request for regulatory adaptations (rectius: modifications) finds an explanation, as well as the assumption of positions inconsistent with the intent of a totalizing sharing, necessary instead in a logic of integration (in which the interest must prevail common over the particularistic one of the participants in the Union). It is no coincidence that the analysis of this reality in the literature has resulted in assessments that now refer to a «gatekeeper» action by the British central government towards the European Community (to safeguard national sovereignty), now to a manifest «semi -detachment» of Great Britain from the construction of the EU (see among others George, Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992; Moravcsik, Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, n. 4, p. 473 ss); assessments which, lastly, are summed up in the words of Jean-Claude Juncker in an interview on Brexit released on the German public television ARD: «The divorce between the EU and the United Kingdom will not be by mutual consent, but neither was it a great love story".
In this premise, the agreements concluded in Brussels in February 2016 between Prime Minister David Cameron and the European leaders should be analysed, in which Great Britain is recognized as having a special status within the EU. The concessions granted range from the symbolic 'attestation' that said country will not be part of an "ever closer" Union to facilitations of various kinds (among which the possibility of limiting subsidies for EU immigrants takes on specific importance). These agreements constitute irrefutable proof of the difficulties encountered by the EU in coping with the logic of economic convenience set by the United Kingdom as the basis of the methods of participation in the project of the founding fathers of the Community; therefore, it can be said that the decision-making line of this country has privileged, in its choices, a utilitarian calculation on the value motivations (based on cohesion and solidarity) that should have moved the adhering countries.
In the face of such facilitations, the expectations of observers rationally seemed to be oriented towards a referendum vote by Great Britain inspired by a substantial monetization of the 'overall net benefit' deriving from remaining united with Europe. The history of this country, its relational modalities with the EU probably led to believe that a "choice" attributable to the affirmation of an economic rationality that proposes itself, in a self-referential key, as the only paradigm for regulating coexistence would have prevailed. In other words, it seemed conceivable that the choice between in or out would be based on a 'cost/benefit' calculation, in line with market principles and, therefore, merely instrumental in achieving an efficient allocation of available resources. In this order of ideas, some time ago I expressed the belief that the referendum would have ended with an option in favor of 'Remain', clearly attributable to assessments of a neutral nature (see The UK Referendum and Brexit Hypothesis (The Way Out Perspective and the Convenience to 'Remain United', in Open Review of Management, Banking and Finance, March 2016).
In the light of the foregoing, we need to ask ourselves what happened, how can the abandonment of a behavioral line consistent with the rationale that, over time, guided relations between Great Britain and the European Union be explained. These are the questions to which it is not possible to give definite and peacefully shared answers; this, above all in reference to the repercussions that Brexit is having in the UK where – under the emotional impulse of a change full of unknowns (destined to deny the hopes of many young people already imbued with a captivating European spirit) – varied proposals are being made who would like to annul the result of a vote that is rejected by large sections of the population.
It will be the analyzes of the times to come that will clarify the reasons for a decision that arouses bitterness and concern; however, it seems clear from now on that the sentiments of a country that has wanted to say no to integration with continental states have prevailed over culture and rationality. The English countryside – poorly informed about the real extent of the Europeanisation process underway (as can be deduced from the peak of searches on 'What is the EU' implemented via Google) – has given ample space to a nationalistic spiral ( which benefited from the consent of a large part of the over-sixty electorate) based on nostalgic memories of an unrepeatable past. Added to this are the effects of the call for independence, which - contrary to the literal meaning of the term - expresses, in this case, intolerance for the regulatory constraints imposed by the EU, as well as a lack of solidarity and sharing for the other Europe. Thus, university centers of excellence, such as Oxford, Cambridge and others still had to give way to a sort of rebellion of the lower and middle classes who, feeling marginalized, wanted to break ties with continental countries in the erroneous belief of thereby eliminating the causes of one's dissatisfaction.
We are, therefore, in the presence of a choice that neglects (rectius: forgets) the advantages (not only economic) deriving from the Union; first of all the long period of peace that the latter has made possible between peoples who, for centuries, have fought each other, avoiding the meeting for the construction of a "common home". The limits deriving from the insular connotation of Great Britain appear to us in their entirety, never as today indicative of a separateness that perhaps it would have been appropriate to overcome; even at the cost of disregarding Churchill's well-known indications: «every time we have to decide between Europe and the open sea, we will always choose the open sea» (cf. Beevor, d-day: history of the Normandy landings, Rizzoli, 2013 ).
However, on closer consideration, the acceptance of the referendum decision – however anti-historical it may appear at this moment, due to its opposition to a process of integration that by now seemed irreversible – can become a propositional event for a review of European policies. Giving an urgent and firm response to the desire to exit expressed by the United Kingdom is the indispensable prerequisite for preventing populist and xenophobic currents from taking over, taking advantage of the climate of uncertainty that today characterizes relations between the countries of the "old continent »; in this context, the words of Romano Prodi are a warning: "the European project has not yet reached the point of no return, ... (therefore) ... Europe could even fail" (cf. the speech given on 23 March 2007 in the Senate of the Italian Republic).
