I'm still trying to digest the shock of the English referendum, a deep wound in the history of the European Union: which first of all must alert us to the dramatic dangers of thewave of sentiments of anti-politics and anti-elites that shakes advanced countries, which can lead to disastrous decisions that are then difficult to reverse. Those movements are now present in many European countries; we cannot underestimate the danger of slipping down an inclined plane of nationalistic claims and pursuits which can endanger the very survival of the Union. A political response from the Union, or from a narrower circle of its founding countries or its major countries, cannot be missing. Provided we know how to clearly identify the objectives.
We will first have to decide what to do with the United Kingdom. In my opinion the problem is very complicated for the United Kingdom, much less so for the European Union. The United Kingdom must decide no less if it wants to stay in the European internal market, or if it wants to leave it. The thing perhaps not yet well understood among the English proponents of the LEAVE is that this is a package that can be bought all together, or not bought at all. The four freedoms of movement – of goods, services, capital and people – are a cornerstone of the Treaty establishing the Union (TEU) and are not separable. You can't, especially have the first three and drop the fourth. There will not and cannot be any negotiations on this between the Union and the United Kingdom (provided it remains united after the unfortunate outcome of the referendum).
The goal of closing the borders to immigrant workers from other EU countries has been one of the winning battlehorses in the pro-BREXIT. Going back, for the British, will not be easy; but I think it will be inevitable, because the economic costs of losing access to the Union's internal market would be devastating – primarily for the City, which would lose its function as a gateway for big capital from the rest of the world to 'European Union. So, here the great paradox: The UK will most likely continue to obey European rules, including decisions of the European Court of Justice, but will no longer participate in their writing. As regaining control over one's destinies, that's not bad.
Choosing a negotiating strategy will be more complicated. The United Kingdom will tend to delay the notification envisaged by article 50 of the TEU, to try to unify the two tables of the modalities of the withdrawal and the definition of the new structure of relations with the Union. The Union has no reason to unify the two tables. Article 50 does not ask for it, which only refers to the need to "take into account the framework of future relations with the Union" of the outgoing country. The reasons for negotiating tactics do not suggest it, given that linking the issues on the two tables obviously benefits only the United Kingdom. Nor would there be much to be gained for the Union if it agreed to start negotiating the future set-up of relations with the United Kingdom even before having received the notification of the intention to withdraw and, more importantly, before knowing the mandate with which the British Parliament will ask its government to start the withdrawal procedure.
A few brief considerations on the relaunch of the Union. What I would try to do is not imagine ambitious treaty reforms, which are not possible today, but to decisively consolidate what is already being done on the various fronts of the economy, immigration and security - also re-establishing, where necessary, the authority of the common institutions vis-à-vis the member states which they do not apply joint decisions, for example on immigration.
So, it's primarily about resume negotiations on the banking unioncomplemented by single bank deposit insurance and a common system of tax guarantee of last resort. The negotiations are blocked due to the inability to find a balance between Germany's requests to reduce the risks in the balance sheets of the banks of the periphery (read above all Italy) and that of the southern periphery to accept a greater sharing of the risks. Since risk sharing inevitably implies elements of fiscal union, it brings with it in perspective the establishment of a figure of European finance minister, endowed with discretionary powers of intervention to enforce the common guidelines of economic policy established by the Council. This figure should answer for his acts not only to the Council, but also to the European Parliament, finding there an increased source of democratic legitimacy.
on immigration, the integrity of the Schengen agreements must be restored, restore credibility to common decisions on the management of migratory flows and give concrete implementation to the Italian ideas of a migration compact that envisages significant investments for development in the countries that we must convince to collaborate in stopping migratory flows. On security, I would start by implementing the decisions already prepared for the next European Council for the establishment of a common EU border police.
The cherry on the cake would be one incisive initiative for growth and employment, especially youth, as the heads of government of Germany, France and Italy indicated their intention to do in the joint declaration after the meeting in Berlin on 27 June.
In short, rather than unrealistic leaps forward, which there won't be, we must think of feasible concrete decisions, even if not easy ones, which demonstrate that the Union not only survives, but is strengthened. If things are well done and clearly explained, even the thread of consensus of public opinion can begin to reconnect.
