Europe 1919-1920. The Great War ended, Europe seamlessly continues its civil war in the wake of the Russian October. Now the conflict is no longer between states but between classes. There are fewer deaths, but the atmosphere is in some ways even hotter. The bourgeoisie and the state apparatuses have in fact gone through many conflicts between nations in the previous century, managing to survive and maintain internal control even in the event of military defeat, but this time the risk is existential. It's about not being swept from the scene forever.
Germany and Italy are seen by Moscow as the two most promising areas for revolution. One lost the war and the other won it, but they share a fragile and unstable social structure. However, German social democracy maintains a reformist orientation, while Italian socialism, amid a thousand contradictions, seems conquered by the revolutionary perspective. In 1919 the PSI was the party with the most votes but remained in opposition and allied itself in the field with the anarchists. Italy is overwhelmed by political strikes, through which, in the Sorelian tradition, one thinks of reaching power. The Nitti government initially tries to respond politically. It tries to divide the socialists from the anarchists and to repress only the political strikes, limiting itself to controlling the purely trade union ones. However, the expansion of the movement frightens the industrialists, who press the government for more decisive action. In March 1920 Nitti has Turin occupied by 50 soldiers, but the loyalty of the troops is limited to the Royal Guard.
In early June, the Bersaglieri revolt and the mutiny spreads to other military corps in many central-northern regions. Unable to control the situation, Nitti resigns. The eighty-year-old Giolitti was then called back to service, skilled sea captain and man for all seasons. However, everything seems to fall apart in early September, when the large factories are occupied by the workers, who begin to manage them independently and organize themselves militarily. The industrialists are effectively dispossessed and the Soviet-inspired factory councils control production. What does Giolitti do in a situation that is now beyond the insurrection and already has the connotations of a complete revolution? Nothing, absolutely nothing. The weeks go by, the state seems to have dissolved, but Giolitti waits motionless. And quiet too, it should be added. He knows that any sign of nervousness would be nothing more than evidence of weakness. At the end of September the contradictions between the union and the PSI and within the socialist leadership were such as to paralyze the movement. The solidarity of popular public opinion towards the occupiers remains broad but shows clear signs of weakening. An agreement is signed. The union achieves great economic success, but control of the factories returns to the industrialists. The political defeat is historic. I wanted the workers to have their own experience, Giolitti would later write recalling those weeks. They'll try it, I thought, they'll see it's a dream and it will cure them of dangerous illusions.
United States, April 1961. Cuba, the murky and languid Las Vegas ante litteram of the Americans, has been governed for two years by Castro, a nationalist who is increasingly assuming a socialist coloring. The pearl of the Caribbean has become a very painful thorn in the side of the United States, which considers the Americas, especially in the era of division between the blocs, its own. For more than a year, the CIA has been preparing military action to overthrow Castro. New President Kennedy, as soon as he arrives at the White House, is immediately informed and gives his consent. However, the preparation of the operation takes place in the worst possible way and amidst leaks of news that give Castro the opportunity to prepare. Kennedy is now perplexed but the landing operation in the Bay of Pigs has now begun and takes place without his knowledge. The military defeat is immediate, but what is more serious are the political fallout. Castro throws himself into the arms of the Soviets and asks them to plant atomic bombs in front of Miami. In October 1962 the world risks a nuclear holocaust. In the following decades, Castroism, which left to itself would probably have withered within a few years, will spread in a populist version to many other Latin American countries.
Hong Kong, September 2014. Students invade the streets and initiate civil disobedience action against the decision, inspired by Beijing, to impose a change in the electoral law which, in fact, would deprive the city of the autonomy it has always enjoyed. The movement enjoys broad consensus and shows unexpected strength. Beijing is extremely angry. Hong Kong already enjoys numerous privileges compared to the mother country and the protest action takes place in full view of all the televisions in the world. What is the Chinese leadership doing to regain control of the rebel city? Nothing, absolutely nothing. He confined himself to waiting and tying his relationship with the city magnates behind the scenes, who were also irritated by the revolt of the middle classes. In mid-December the movement leaves the streets it occupied. Beijing refrains from a Tiananmen-style crackdown but piquefully retaliates by conceding nothing, absolutely nothing, to the movement.
Greece and Germany, 2015. Tsipras' electoral victory in January aroused a wave of sympathy in a significant part of public opinion in non-German Europe. The grip of austerity, which had already been loosened for two years, suddenly appears to be breakable and a new Europe appears possible thanks to the fact that Tsipras does not renege on his electoral promises and even further raises the bar. Merkel, who by backing Samaras had redone the mistake she made in France (Sarkozy's German sponsorship contributed to her defeat and Hollande's victory), senses the grave danger and decides to keep the lowest possible profile on Greece. The initial coldness towards Tsipras gives way to a conversational and smiling attitude. If Tsipras tries to appear victim, martyr and therefore hero, Merkel, who for years has unceremoniously beaten Orbán in Hungary at every opportunity, appears very respectful and calm. Tsipras has to cook slowly in his broth and Merkel supplies him with the gas necessary for cooking in the form of a drip of water and sugar that plugs the holes that depositor leaks create in Greek banks. Greece is being kept solvent with loans that serve only to repay maturing debts and are therefore just a game changer. Tsipras, for his part, starts to cook badly in his broth.
It doesn't have much room for maneuver, but it doesn't use the available ones either, and it does practically nothing on the home front. Play everything on the big shot, snatch a lot of money from Europe or default. It is the building of socialism with other people's money. The game theorist Varoufakis seems at times to propose a homeopathic and civilized version of North Korean extortionist socialism, to play crazy and threaten havoc to get some humanitarian money under the table. In this way Tsipras quickly squanders his sympathy capital with which it started and ceases to represent an exportable model. Podemos, which had started running strong in the polls by proposing a Spanish version of the Greek experience, was damaged and began to lose speed. The European Mediterranean governments, which had initially winked at Tsipras and made a bit of a leap, are realigning themselves with Germany. Greece remains a thorn in the side, but is declassified as a local problem. You still have the possibility of structurally weakening the euro and the Eurozone, but you no longer have the possibility of politically infecting other countries and making the continent ungovernable, an even more serious danger than the first in German eyes. Keeping Greece in conditions of mere survival is not a problem for Europe. The Greek GDP, ever smaller, is one and a half percent of the European one. The Bank of Greece can replace depositors and the ECB can replace the Bank of Greece. Greek debt to Europe can be constantly refinanced by Europe itself. No one will touch Tsipras and if Tsipras wants to do something sensational he will have to do it himself, paying the price. If, on the other hand, he wants to limit himself to living on subsidies, he will have subsidies, but he will not create growth and he will end his experience perhaps in a thousand years, but ingloriously.
Markets. US earnings are coming out a little better than expected and the strong dollar doesn't appear to have hurt them as much as previously thought. Symmetrically, however, it is possible that the profits of European exporters come out less brilliant than expected. The fact is that currency realignments take a few quarters to unfold their effects. Stock exchanges, on the other hand, discount these effects almost instantly. A pause in the European rise is therefore physiological and there would have been in any case even without Greece.
