Writing about Italian banks, claiming to arrive at presentable summaries, is at the moment a work beyond anyone's strength and, perhaps, simply useless, there are so many open questions. From the Government's stop and go on reforms, to the sector authorities' tactic of waiting for events, from the self-reforms inspired by the "now, now we're really here!", to the formidable European legislation on crisis resolution and Guarantee Funds ( read bail-in in one word), taking positions by the European Commission and other European supervisory bodies, always with the gun aimed at state aid to the sector and always suspicious, with some reason, towards the alchemies of the countries of the South To situations of banking crises, numerous and substantial, still far from being resolved.
Reason why if we really believe we have something to say, it is better to refer to the fragmentary Greek poets, those whose shreds of verses have been found on some shard, leaving the reconstruction of the lyric written around those few remains to the imagination of the exegetes. In doing so, we also leave freedom of interpretation to our readers on what we are going to say.
Fragment 1: self-reform of the CCBs It is still working in progress months after the start of the modification works. Today it appears to us as a colorful patchwork full of analyses, contributions, projects and proposals. In cooperative credit, l'imagination a pris le povoir, one would have said in the Sixties. We used an algorithm on the Internet to search for stylistic features or semantic recurrences, with the hope of essentially distinguishing the conspicuous mass of documents produced so far, in support of the various proposals.
Just as it is used in literature by resorting to the textual analysis of a work. The result was oriented, rather than to variables of an economic nature (market, intermediation, costs, industrial projects, which would have seemed more significant to us), to recurrences such as: self-reform, hetero-reform, indivisible reserves, contract of domination, group, groups, more or less cooperative, cross guarantees, equality and the like. What emerges is a variegated attitude of the proponents of maintaining the biodiversity existing in our credit system, a luxuriance of nature in front of which one cannot fail to be dazzled; from the petrified forest of the 90s to the tropical forest rich in flora and fauna of today, to be preserved for their planetary uniqueness.
All Pandas to be protected, animal rights associations would say for their part. And all or almost all of the BCCs are convinced that they can transform themselves into something else, subject to laws, laws or amendments. This approach is completed by what is happening outside of cooperative credit, where many new corporate models have been created for the exercise of credit activity from which one enters and exits, as if through revolving doors (from the dual, to the traditional , monistic). We are witnessing the proliferation of the original strains of the lex mercatoria (cooperatives and joint-stock companies) in new juridical mutants: popular companies that must become Spas, popular companies that remain popular ope legis, listed and unlisted Spas, and so on. We are unable to judge the systemic evolution, but the creation of new models must then take into account the many market problems that Italian banks are facing and whose resolution will determine the success or otherwise of any innovative corporate engineering. which so excites the best minds of our bankers. In the case of cooperative credit, we too try to add a model which, unlike the others, has two very precise references.
The first is that its essence is strongly rooted in the current legal framework (it is not a genetic mutant), the second is that it does not claim to resolve the issues of all the BCCs in a thaumaturgical way, but only those that really want to take advantage of the reform to strengthen themselves on the market and increase capital levels (he intends to select in a Darwinian way). That is, it is for those BCCs that have an industrial plan and not just the desire to change their clothes, aware that the real risk for a bank, in the times of Basel and other pervasive regulation, derives first of all from itself, as shown by the problems, sometimes lethal, such as money laundering, loss of credit and cost control, endemic conflicts of interest generated by inadequate and lopsided governance.
The CCBs that reach a certain size could then spin off the bank into a limited company of which the cooperative would acquire ownership, possibly together with other sister companies, assimilated by homogeneous parameters, also induced to transfer their assets to the newco. This solution could attract investors of different origins, thanks to the emphasis on the stronger legal profiles of the joint-stock cooperative company and the capital company. Cooperative continuity in ownership and bank managed according to efficiency criteria, as required of a joint stock company. A healthy commistio sanguinis to be obtained substantially in a given order. "For the shareholders and for the market" could be the slogan of this model which so far does not seem to have appeared on the scene yet and which could prove to be a virtuous model of growth and reduction in the number of mutual banks and who knows, if, precisely for these reasons , attractive to the supervisory authorities themselves.
Fragment 2 : of the BRRD and DGS Community Directives If the topic dealt with above has to do with the mutations of living beings, this fragment concerns subjects in articulo mortis, or even already passed away, as occurs with bank corpses brought in with increasing frequency in the morgue of Guarantee Funds. We apologize for the crudeness of the representation, but, in short, hypocrisy aside, it is good to call things by their name. The change imposed by the new European directives for exiting the banking market with the crisis resolution system causes substantial changes to the current regulatory framework, arousing general bewilderment and growing concern among employees. So fears and confusion reign supreme.
The rules are many, complex, difficult to read and have a dangerous impact, which, starting from the 2016 New Year's Eve party, will also be alive for us. There are many who are struggling in the face of this new non-Justinian juridical corpus, so it would be pretentious to add anything from our own. What is important is to hope that in the new context some critical elements that have marked the Italian system in governing the situations of decoded banking subjects are not reproduced in practice. In particular, the prevalence of discretion with respect to the rules must be avoided, the conflict of interest taking away responsibility inherent in the supervisory function and in crisis management, the role of simple paying officer represented by the Guarantee Funds, devoid of any power to prevent towards the insured banks, and other ambiguities present in the present management of the crises.
Fragment 3 : the Deviants Two recent articles by Paolo Savona and Andrea Greco have had the merit of turning the spotlight on those who will bear the losses of the banking crises as a result of the European regulations being introduced. In particular, the first author belongs to the category of deviants, i.e. those who are still able to raise their critical voice on a series of relevant issues, belonging to the unedifying history of the Italian banking system in recent years. These assessments emerge in contrast to the uncritical approvals or unconvincing defenses of those who represent and supervise the system. We want to be direct once again and affirm that to the mere, sterile and incomplete accounting of the experts, we prefer the grandiose and terrible frescoes by Dickens, Melville, Steinbeck on the effects of economic and financial crises, testifying that literature explains the events more effectively than science and technology. And banking is often at the center of much tragic literature, to which the recent crisis has given new life. On the contrary, forgive the boldness, but it would almost be like reversing the relationship: that, if great literature is not generated, one cannot even speak of a real crisis.
So who pays if a bank fails? Who pays the economic and social cost? According to the new European banking policies, the answer is "no longer the taxpayer", but, finally, also the saver, if he was rash enough to buy a) subordinated bank bonds, b) ordinary bonds, c) deposits over one hundred thousand euros , without realizing the risk of failure of their bank. In short, if he had too much faith, too bad for him. Calvinistically, there is no longer the forgiveness that everyone absolves, with the blessing of Pantalone. On the contrary, since in Italy we had already understood for some time where the wind would be blowing, we Pantalone have not made it pay for a while, as resounding official press releases from the profession and the supervisory authorities tell us (taken from a not exactly misaligned press) which read: "Savers have never lost a euro due to the bankruptcy of a bank in Italy and neither have taxpayers, with the exception of those 4 billion expelled from the Treasury for Monte dei Paschi, but which you will see in the end we will fully recover to the coffers of the state". Forgive us if we disagree.
What guarantee has been ensured to those savers who, perhaps even by getting into debt, have converted, until a few months ago, savings into bank shares that had already raised reservations about their solidity on the part of the European Supervisory Authority. Deafening silences and judiciary at work! How much are the subordinated bonds, even at the smallest banks, distributed liberally among retail customers who are not fully aware of the risks required to support already fragile assets? We do not know. In fact, do you know when it becomes known? When the Guarantee Funds are called to the bedside of the now defunct bank and, before intervening with the money of all the associates, they have to have those embarrassing securities recalled in some way, so that no further mistrust is generated about the reputation of the banks and of their associations. Furthermore, the financial history of the Belpaese is full of industrial bailouts by the State which has relieved the banks of their burdens of bad credit. Names, including but not limited to: Montedison, Parmalat, Cirio, Ilva, Alitalia.
Are these savings of the Italians, cheerfully invested or distracted, not perhaps worthy of protection? A few more attentive journalists, reconstructing the Ilva story, recalled that, before being sold to the Rivas, it had been relieved, in a non-transparent manner and at the expense of the State, of debts of 8000 billion lire to banks and other creditors. Furthermore, it is commonly believed that Alitalia's definitive bill has not yet been presented. To conclude, it is of general interest not so much to know why banking crises occur (there always will be, despite the merits of Prof. Draghi), but how they are dealt with. And so far, directly or indirectly, those who have paid are always and only the citizens, because even prevention has left something to be desired. It doesn't seem that, with the new rules, much changes, as prof. Savona. The European context that is emerging remains illiberal and of dubious constitutionality with respect to art. 47 which protects and encourages savings in any form, which for consistency should now be integrated with the amendment "net of the bail-in", ie net of the mutualisation of bank losses for the saver. But, given that not even before it was written that savings were preserved "net of the taxpayer's bail-out", we can spare ourselves this useless modification of the Sacred Text.
