The recent debate on motorways has identified renationalisation as a potential solution to the ills afflicting the sector. Indeed, as we shall see, a mature debate should focus on the rules system that govern the relationship between the grantor and the concessionaire.
In theory, the management of the motorways could be entrusted to a public company as was also the case in Italy before privatisation. Of course, renationalizing has a cost: upon expiry of the concession, the residual value of the investments incurred and not yet depreciated should be recognized to private individuals. The same principle applies to the French motorway concession system.
Is it true that public companies can apply lower rates? It is often argued that a fully public company would be able to borrow at rates below the cost of capital, resulting in lower rates. However, such an argument is far from peaceful. According to various scholars, the risks of a chosen public investment without a thorough cost-benefit analysis – or a poorly constructed investment – fall on taxpayers who are not compensated for those risks. If we look at reality, in the infrastructure sector, the practice of defining the recognized cost of capital (WACC) for public operators abstracts from any considerations about ownership: The Welsh water manager, the Dutch energy operators, and the Grid itself Ferroviaria Italiana receive a WACC on the basis of a "market" financial structure. Finally, for a public monopolist, not solicited by the stimuli of competition, the step from being "benevolent" to being inefficient is short.
Thus we arrive at the role of economic regulation, the true cornerstone of a sector design. The characteristic of "natural monopoly" of the highways it requires the presence of an institution aimed at controlling the tariffs and the efficiency of the managers.
Compared to other infrastructural sectors, the regulatory model of the Anglo-Saxon tradition which envisages an independent authority for the definition of the tariff method is slow to arrive, and not only in Italy (the Italian regulator is operational but has no powers over ongoing concessions). The reasons for this arrangement should be investigated further and they probably also have a historical reason, since the State is traditionally the builder of road infrastructures.
However, the role of the authorities has grown in many European countries on the control front of performance and returns. In England, it was deemed necessary in 2015 to give more powers to an independent authority to monitor Highways England. Until 2010, the system exhibited inadequate and inefficient planning. Today, Highways England must meet targets for satisfaction, accident reduction, efficiency and network conditions based on key performance indicators consistent with the national transport strategy. In France, the Competition Authority has been reporting since 2013 the excessive profitability of road concessions. It is no coincidence that in 2015 an authority was established with the responsibility of annually analyzing the level of returns. Without forgetting the growing surveillance function of the European Commission which, also in the recent occasion of the revision of the Italian motorway concessions, has led to a reduction in the rate of remuneration and guarantees of greater competition for the assignment of the works.
The Italian regulatory framework is the result of a disorganized and stratified reform process, which we do not want to retrace here. The effect was a weakening of the engineering control function, tariff heterogeneity and lack of transparency. Regardless of ownership, what matters is the system of rules with which to entrust, regulate and control concessions.
A first step would be to strengthen the technical controls by the grantor, remedy the tariff fragmentation by identifying a new set of rules (for example, relating to the recognition of investments and the balance of commercial risk between operators and users) subject to broad public consultation and on which to converge the entire motorway system. These are apparently minimal principles but in reality they would outline a significant "change" with respect to current practices and rules.
