There was a time, not too long ago, when independent authorities appeared as the functioning model of an administration. For the technical competence of the top management and staff, but also for the organizational methods and effectiveness.
The key to this success was seen, in an era of party-based subdivision of the public apparatus, in the ability to remain independent from politics. The organizational and governance definition models of the independent authorities established in the 90s aimed in fact to ensure that functions of protecting sensitive interests, such as competition, privacy and freedom of information, or regulating important sectors of the economy, such as that of energy or communications, were removed from the influence of those who momentarily held power. Hence, methods of appointing the President and the members of the authorities which were substantially based on two models: a direct appointment by the Speakers of the House and the Senate, respectively the second and third office of the State, and therefore considered guarantors of the impartiality of the institutions, as in the case of the Competition Authority; oua government appointment subsequently confirmed by the Parliamentary Commissions with a two-thirds majority, as in the case of the Energy Authority, of the original design of the Communications Authority, and, more recently, of the nominated but not yet established Transport Authority.
These procedures, established in the period of political crisis that goes from the beginning of the 90s to the end of the technical governments, however, they have not been able to contain party influence, when politics has recovered its role. An attentive and cautious observer, such as Assonime, has recently observed that “one of the main shortcomings of the various appointment systems envisaged by our legal system is the obscurity of the candidate selection channels. The impression is that the choice usually takes place between direct or indirect acquaintances of the subjects called to make the appointment."
We could be more explicit: starting from 2000, there are many episodes in which the appointment procedures of the Authorities appear to have been guided by considerations not necessarily linked to the competence of the chosen persons. Just to name a few, a former mayor of Bologna was parked as a member of the Antitrust Authority, who (goodness of him) soon resigned to participate in the subsequent elections; in many cases, members at the end of their mandates were transferred from one authority to another; often the criterion of choice appears to have been that of dependence on regulated parties or companies, and not that of independence.
There is an anecdote circulating in circles about a professor recognized as an expert on competition who, as the Authority's deadline approached, took the liberty of submitting his candidacy to a President of one of the Chambers, only to be told that the post was already assigned to a person not as competent, but who the President would have been happy to appoint to the Procurement Authority. To which the professor replied that he was interested in competition, not a position in some authority.
But beyond the anecdotes, the inadequacy of the systems for designating the top authorities has given rise to real risks of institutional dysfunction. In 2004 the composition of the Electricity and Gas Authority was expanded from three to five members: and this to leave room for appointments that could satisfy the main interested parties: who, however, were unable to agree, so that for almost seven years the Authority was managed (moreover very well) by the President and by a single member, while in the parliamentary commissions the candidatures of the other members were blocked by reciprocal vetoes from the parties.
More recently, theThe establishment of the Transport Authority is prevented by the difficulty, on the part of the Parliamentary Commissions, of ratifying the nomination proposals of the Government, including the President Emeritus of the Council of State, somewhat as if President Napolitano were appointed Minister in the next government. Finally, even the appointment of the Communications Authority, in the format reduced to five members required by the Salva-Italia Decree, has not failed to arouse the same criticisms of the past regarding the degree of competence of the components.
In general, it has been noted that in the last decade the components of the authorities have been chosen, certainly with notable exceptions, with little regard for the competence in the matters entrusted to them, and instead with attention to the political balance. The problem is not limited to the composition of the Colleges but, naturally, it is reflected in the organizational structures: in many cases the top officials have ceased to be the permanent references of the structure, to become temporary references of the Presidents in office.
In short, even in the Authorities the distinction between the direction function and the management function which should instead characterize an efficient functioning of the Administration has been lost. It is then clear that the question of the appointments of the Authorities requires a radical reform: and perhaps this is a task that a new Parliament could set itself, less conditioned by the logic of belonging than in the past. The criterion could then be to adopt procedures that make the choices more transparent.
In Great Britain, the choice of top management takes place through a public call, even not limited only to citizens of the United Kingdom: the criteria are those of competence in the subjects administered. Among these, the choice is then made by submitting it to the competent Parliamentary Commissions. A mechanism of this kind could also be introduced in our country, naturally with the modifications that our situation requires. On the other hand, it is the proposal contained in a very recent study by Assonime, which suggests that candidatures can be advanced by candidates or other subjects, and that they are examined by a third party body (a consultancy firm or a public institution) and then reported to the Government, which is entrusted with the task of designation, which should however be motivated in relation to the recommendations of the technical body. The process should then be concluded by the public hearing of the candidates by the Parliamentary Commissions, which should express themselves with a qualified majority. In short, a process that guarantees a balancing and control system that facilitates the choice of the most competent subjects. The important thing, however, is that these criteria are regulated and proceduralised: otherwise the risk of convenient solutions is high; This was, for example, the case of the recent appointments to the Communications Authority, for which the Government requested the sending of curricula which, however, it seems to have taken little account of, compared to the prevalence of indications of political origin. The choice of the competence criterion for the appointment of the top management can only have a positive effect on the overall functioning of the institutions, which are not only represented by the College, but by the entire organization whose efficiency and effectiveness, it should not be forgotten, depends on who governs them .
