Le independent authorities they are essential for the proper functioning of the economy; these provide adequate technical expertise in complex subjects that require a particular specialisation. There are various needs that lead to the establishment of these bodies, the main one is undoubtedly that of ensuring stability in the decision-making process, isolating it from the fluctuations connected to the political cycle. In fact, independence from the executive makes it possible to guarantee impartiality in cases in which the supervised subjects include companies under public control and markets undergoing liberalisation.
In Italy, the legal framework of the independent authorities has developed in successive phases without a unitary design and this has led to some shortcomings. To solve these problems, ensure the effectiveness of the institutional action of the independent authorities and increase the trust of operators, Assonime, the Association of Italian joint-stock companies, is proposing a review of the system of independent authorities.
The first proposal concerns i relations with the Parliament. Independence from the executive requires the authorities to be accountable to Parliament for their programs and activities. On paper, the forms and venues for discussions with Parliament already exist; however, in practice the mechanisms do not seem to work. To improve these relations, Assonime proposes to set up a bicameral commission for relations with the authorities, which will ensure that the authorities have a stable parliamentary interlocutor. Furthermore, it is proposed to enhance the examination by the Parliament itself of the reports of the authorities and, in the event that these reports are not followed up, to ask the Government to explain the reasons for the choice.
The second problem analyzed concerns the competency framework and their rationalization. Over the years, the range of action of the various authorities has been progressively extended, both in terms of regulated economic sectors (integrated water sector, postal service, transport sector), and in terms of areas of intervention (administrative consumer protection, copyright , resolution of disputes between private individuals, power to appeal against acts of other administrations). Assonime's proposal is to complete the process of assigning the independent authorities the tasks of economic regulation in the main public services, assigning the responsibility for the collection and management of waste to an independent regulator.
With regard to the review of competences, for the purposes of a possible downsizing, it should be kept in mind that not all regulatory functions are permanent: in some sectors, the need for an ex ante regulator may disappear with the evolution of the markets in a competitive sense. Therefore, according to Assonime, the need to periodically review the regulation becomes appropriate, entrusting this task to the bicameral Commission for competition and relations with the authorities. As well as requesting the authorities to identify the priorities of institutional action over a multi-year time horizon and to announce them to Parliament and to public opinion. The last question in terms of responsibilities is that of the possible unification of some functions to reduce the number of authorities in the perspective of the spending review, according to Assonime, overlapping between the responsibilities of the authorities must be avoided which unjustifiably increase costs and reduce legal certainty .
Another theme on which Assonime is working is the – crucial – one of naming mechanisms of the components. In particular, technical competence requirements need to be strengthened; provide for a transparent system for the collection of applications that allows the reporting of names also to subjects other than the candidates; assigning the task of screening the applications to third parties; entrust the Government with the designation of candidates in compliance with the legal requirements and taking into account the technical examination of the candidates carried out by the third party body; provide for a parliamentary confirmation procedure which requires a public hearing of the candidate and a favorable opinion by a two-thirds majority from the competent parliamentary committee. Lastly, the term of office must be 7/8 years without the possibility of renewal or transfer to another authority.
Another point to be reviewed, according to Assonime, is the funding of the authorities and expenditure control. There are four proposals that fall into this category: the first is to anchor the authority's power to impose capital benefits on the market to clear and verifiable regulatory assumptions, such as for example the costs of supervision and control. The second consists in avoiding those forms of financing that can distort the incentives of the authorities in carrying out the institutional activity, such as financing through sanctions and systems of transfer of resources between authorities. The third proposal, on the other hand, concerns the valorisation of Parliament's control of the estimate of the authorities' three-year needs which must be linked to the objectives of the institutional action and accompanied by an independent report on the results of the economic and organizational management. The latest is related to a modernization and strengthening of the Court of Auditors which allows the inclusion of new professionals of an economic type: in this way it is ensured that the control over the economic management of the authorities is not limited to formal profiles.
Finally, the last aspect being studied by Assonime is the guarantee regimeaunts. In particular, for the adoption of the general acts of all the authorities, it is necessary to expressly provide for the respect of the principle of proportionality. For individual proceedings of a contentious nature and disciplinary proceedings, it is necessary to provide for enhanced guarantees of the rights of defence.
Attachments: Assonime report
