There are three reasons why, in my opinion, the government has chosen the so-called Marzano law amended in 2005 and not the Prodi law amended in 1999 as a model of extraordinary administration for Alitalia. The first reason is that in this way the government he held the cue ball in his hand, was able to be the dealer, deal the cards, and was able to recover some of the credibility he had lost in the collective imagination together with the company's management after the rejection of the pre-agreement with the union. He kept the ball because, with the modified Marzano, the bankruptcy court arrives only a few days later, it limits itself to certifying the company's insolvency (of course, all workers and all Italians should be rooting for the court to ascertain the solvency instead , and deny the commissioner) while, with the modified Prodi, the court should have moved first.
At this point of the discussion it is good to make an aside and clarify the main difference between the two laws in a simplified way. With Prodi, the commissioner keeps the assets operational, therefore alive (brand, logo, aircraft, flight rights, etc.), exhibits them in the square, that is, offers them to the best buyer, sells them with a competitive procedure, an auction , and with the proceeds he pays the debts, satisfies the creditors, according to the order imposed by the bankruptcy law (first the workers, then the privileged, then the unsecured) to the extent permitted by the accumulated sum. When the money from the sale runs out, creditors who have not yet been paid are left dry. It is wrong to call this procedure a stew, because it is rather the burning test carried out by the only true expert: the market. If the market appreciated all the assets, for example the rights on domestic routes and those on intercontinental routes, there would be no stew.
If, on the other hand, he appreciates only a part of it, it is useless to blame the extraordinary administration. With the other law, i.e. with Marzano, the commissioner also has the power to seek (not asset buyers, but) investors who, as candidate new shareholders (those who were there before have in the meantime been expropriated) would introduce into the company enough money to satisfy (again according to the order of the bankruptcy law) the creditors to an extent (preferably not less than the first alternative) that the bankruptcy court (after hearing the creditors' supervisory board) approves in the form of an arrangement with creditors. At that point the investors (called underwriters) find themselves shareholders in a company with an intact operating structure and no more debt.
Here we come to the second reason for the choice made. With the adoption of Marzano, the government has made it known that it would prefer the second solution, that is, that of a composition that safeguards the integrity of the company. This noble and impressive yearning is pleasing to the union, which in the rejection of the pre-agreement was the government's companion in misfortune, but also an optimistic, unrealistic yearning. In fact, in order to be able to find investors-underwriters willing to put a lot of money into the company, the prospect that in the end, after the agreement, remains debt-free, it is not enough at all, it is necessary rather that it stands in terms of economic management . Otherwise, further losses would lead to erosion of the financial means introduced and therefore new debts. And we would be back to scratch as happened after 2008, that is, after the first commissioner. Is it clear or not?
At this point of the discussion I have to make a second explanatory passage. Economist Ugo Arrigo said the average load factor of Alitalia aircraft in the recent past has been low and that if it had been higher, things would have been fine. I beg to disagree at all. Processing the final consolidated financial statements for 2015 (the last one known) it emerges that the degree of filling achieved was equal to a good 77 per cent, while the degree of filling necessary to reach the operational economic balance should have exceeded 430 percent of the company's carrying capacity, an absurdity. This result is obtained by applying the breakeven analysis and making the quotient between fixed costs (labour plus depreciation) equal to 712 million and the contribution margin (unit net revenue less variable unit cost for consumption) equal to 0,038 euro per ton of km transported , all further divided by transport capacity.
The 430 percent means that economic equilibrium would not have been reached even if all the planes had always been filled up to one hundred percent. In other words, since the unit net revenue (average rate) is eroded by competition and the unit cost for fuel consumption is incompressible, the consequence is that the economic equilibrium does not support any fixed structural costs (neither work nor depreciation) . Now, since the three appointed commissioners will not be able to achieve anything (I'm talking about a reversal of economic management, of course), it follows that in six months no investor will be found, unless some underground fraud is invented such as it was in 2008 when the then government, in exchange for who knows what, put together Angelucci, Bellavista Caltagirone, the Riva dell'Ilva, etc. etc.
Finally we come to the third reason. Since no investors-underwriters will be found for a bankruptcy arrangement, it will be necessary to turn to the sale of the assets in the square. The advantage at that point will be represented by having taken six months, extendable to nine as already said, so that it will be possible to bypass the 2018 elections and leave the hot potato to the next government. The fact that the period can be extended to nine months is the clearest response to Paolo Mieli who in a TV broadcast had rightly put a halt to the government so that it does not dare to cross over into 2018. The corollary is the so-called bridging loan of 600 million. Already in 2008 the government of the time made a bridging loan of 300 million.
We have seen what it is used for, but people can be fobbed off with anything anyway. The economist Andrea Boitani said that however the State will be a privileged creditor, so there is no danger. Arrigo himself added that with the receivership, Alitalia will be sold at a symbolic price. Now, apart from the fact that it is a non-privileged pre-deduction credit, and that the commissioners will have to maximize the proceeds from the sale to pay the creditors, the problem is that, after having deducted the 600 million to be repaid from the proceeds for the State, there will be little or nothing left to satisfy the creditors. But anyway, creditors are our major banks, and their top management already knew it, they've always known it, and besides, it's not their money.
riccardo.gallo@uniroma1.it
