I would like to mention that the maneuver that we are discussing arises from a pressing invitation by the European Commission for correct our budget balances for the current year. The Commission seemed concerned not so much and not only about the 0,2% gap in the deficit, but about the lack of clearly perceptible objectives for reducing the enormous public debt, a debt which risks exposing us to a negative evaluation by the markets in the moment in which the ECB were to slow down or eliminate, the purchases of government bonds currently underway with the QE program.
So the so-called bureaucrats of Brussels have shown themselves to be much more farsighted and farsighted than many politicians of our house who continually accuse them of a certain bureaucratic "obtuseness". The political meaning, and not just an accounting one, of this request was therefore that of having clear signals on our part on the path we want to take to overcome the semi-stagnation in which we continue to get by. On the one hand, it was a question of designing a gradual but credible trajectory for the public debt reduction, at the same time supporting the competitiveness and therefore the growth potential of our economic system.
Instead we have one maneuver, broad but with not well defined contours, which should probably be able to hit the accounting targets, but which appears overall "inadequate" to send a clear message, not just to markets, but to our own citizens, about where we want to go and how to get there.
As you well know, public debt is calculated not only as an absolute figure, but also in relation to GDP. Therefore, on the one hand we need measures aimed at reducing the debt such as the containment of public spending and privatizations, and on the other measures capable of increasing the competitiveness of our economy such as for example liberalizations, support for public and private investments and the reduction of burdens and bureaucratic obstacles. (To try to increase the GDP and that is the denominator).
But in the 67 articles of the decree, the cuts in public spending are completely marginal, while a serious push for privatization is completely missing. A theory is now establishing itself, also endorsed by authoritative exponents of the Democratic Party, according to which privatization should not be done because the return on public shareholdings in terms of dividends collected would be higher than the cost of the state's debt. It is possible that this is true at a time of particularly low interest rates such as the current one, but if the volume of debt is too high, its sustainability over time is in any case at risk, so a gradual and prudent portfolio lightening policy is however highly advisable, and in many cases, as in ours, indispensable.
As regards the stimulus to growth the proposed measures appear to be dictated more by occasional contingencies than by an organic and coherent vision. Nowhere is competition favored, and indeed in a new platform block Flixbusgoes in the opposite direction. The measures to extend the split payment are bound to damage the liquidity of companies in a period in which credit remains difficult. Public investments continue to decline due to the difficulty of applying the new procurement code, while private investments are recovering following the entry into operation of the rules envisaged in the package Industry 4.0. The lack of efficient public infrastructures hampers the competitiveness of industrial sectors which are also positioning themselves well on international markets and which therefore constitute one of our strengths which, on the other hand, should be supported in every way.
In this regard I note that our trade balance registers a strong surplus and that this demonstrates how unfounded are the arguments of those who argue that it would be better for us to leave the Euro in order to be able to export even more thanks to the devaluation of the "new lira". On the other hand, there could be the paradox that, other conditions being equal, the strong surplus of our external accounts could push our new currency towards a "revaluation" and not a devaluation. The latter would therefore be determined by the crisis of confidence and by the flight from Italy that would follow our unilateral exit from the Euro. All savers, even the smallest ones, would run to the bank to withdraw their deposits to hide the precious Euro banknotes under the mattress. Thus they would protect themselves from devaluation and inflation. The increase in uncertainty would cause a drastic contraction in consumption. The consequence would be the collapse of banks and many companies. In short, we would enter an epochal crisis caused by adventurous and technically incorrect political choices.
Finally, as regards the rule that seeks to reintroduce a form of vouchers for families and small businesses it provesfirstly, how wrong was the previous decision to avoid the referendum by canceling the legislation then in force. There CGIL it is waging an all political battle based on bad data that goes against the interest of casual workers. But the re-proposition of a similar rule in this context does not appear to be a very brilliant idea. In short, two mistakes do not make a right thing. Rather it would have been better to restore the previous legislation on civil liability in contracts. Today, direct responsibility lies primarily with the client himself for problems with subcontractor companies for which the prime contractor cannot have all the information necessary for an accurate assessment of the company situation. This excess of responsibility and the risk of disputes is hampering business activity leading to a further brake on investments.
I conclude by recalling the pressing need for our country to send unequivocal signals to the markets about our willingness to start a gradual reduction of public debtwhile supporting ours competitiveness, so that we can quickly achieve growth rates similar to those of other European countries. We have no time to waste. The ECB's ultra-easy monetary policy won't last long. We must remember that in the 80s, before the birth of the Euro, the weight of the interest we had to pay on the GDP reached 12%. Now we are around 4-5%. An always enormous figure, which limits our possibilities of allocating public resources to investments and policies for the reintegration of people who are out of work, even though they are actively looking for it. Once again we risk having to settle for marginal adjustments, postponing the definition of more credible and effective policies to another occasion. But it is not wise to always trust the Italian Stellone.
