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Europe, who will govern after the vote? Still Von der Leyen or not? With Meloni or not? The possible alternatives

The choice of the new EU leaders after the vote on 8 and 9 June dominates the European scene on which the double French novelty with Le Pen's exploit and Macron's surprising move which dissolved the national Parliament and convened early elections with outcomes yet to be deciphered

Europe, who will govern after the vote? Still Von der Leyen or not? With Meloni or not? The possible alternatives

After what it happened on Sunday evening, two narratives intersect: that one French, with Macron's sensational decision to call new legislative elections, and the European one. I do not pretend to comment on the first, but only to point out that today it would be a mistake to take a victory for the far right on 7 July for granted. However, one possible lost bet by Macron could profoundly influence the European dynamic. Firstly because a possible far-right government in France, without undermining the important powers of the President of the Republic, would destabilize the European politics of one of the great founding countries of the EU. Furthermore, for the effects that this would have on the sovereignist galaxy; a varied and in many ways contradictory set of political forces seeking its own identity. The importance of the French bomb, however, must not lead to the European perspective being overlooked, also because the two narratives are nevertheless destined to intersect.

The just concluded electoral campaign animatedly discussed an unprecedented issue: the outgoing President must be reconfirmed as head of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen (UvdL), designated spitzenkandidat from his party the EPP? The campaign therefore inevitably also became a judgment on his actions and on his person. This incited supporters and opponents of UvdL to qualify their position also according to the type of Europe they hoped for or claimed to hope for. Furthermore, the elections took place against the backdrop of the expectation of strong progress from the right-wing populist and sovereignist parties; they were therefore presented as a choice between “more or less Europe”. This contributed to an electoral campaign characterized by strong polarization deliberately emphasized by the media; a polarization which, however, did not take into account the providential moderating effect of the electoral system, which is everywhere proportional. In light of the results, the relative stability of the European framework is striking, in contrast to the instability and lacerating polarization of many national situations.

Predictions of radical change have been denied

Now we have the results. As expected, while moving on the right the axis of the new Parliament, do not radically modify the balance. The expected progress of the radical right has however been uneven: for example, it was evident in France and Italy, lower than expected a few weeks ago in Germany and Spain, disappointing in Poland. The result, however, is sufficient to make the continuation of the dominance of the traditional dominant coalition which brings together the EPP (popular), SD (socialists) and Renew (liberals), recently also with the help of the greens, more fragile in expectations and now in reality. The question of the future role of sovereignist parties has nevertheless dominated the campaign and now lands on the table of governments and the EP; it concerns above all the relations with Giorgia Meloni, strengthened by the results, at the same time leader of a sovereignist party and at the helm of one of the large EU countries. A person with whom, among other things, UvdL has recently established good relations with a certain ostentation. To the question whether it is right to reconfirm UvdL, we then add the question of whether it is acceptable that FdI, the party of Giorgia Meloni. A question that intersects in a contradictory way with Meloni's declared aspiration to position himself as a leader of one sovereignist alignment. A line-up of which some important members such as Marine Le Pen have made the opposition "to the Europe of UvdL" one of the cornerstones of their electoral campaign. A priori, the confusion therefore seems total. Furthermore, in the event of Marine Le Pen's victory, French developments would inevitably make the dialectic between the two Italian and French leaders one of the important issues in European dynamics.

How to judge Ursula?

In the opinion of many, UvdL was a good President, in the wake of innovators like Delors. It would therefore seem a priori to be destined to win. However, his path is not safe and, according to some, bumpy. In this regard, the famous formula of the "candidate who enters the Conclave as Pope and leaves as Cardinal" is invoked. The criticisms directed at her concern both her centralizing style and some of her political choices. According to the cases, UvdL is accused of being too "Atlantic" and that she went too far in favor of Ukraine and Israel, of being the author of the (for some infamous) green deal but recently also of having betrayed it, of being at the same time too lax and too restrictive in matters of immigration, of having been too tolerant, but also of having failed in its duties of impartiality with respect to potentially illiberal governments such as Orban or the Polish Pis. Navigating these often contradictory criticisms is not easy. Its defenders, however, could respond that the reality of politics is almost always determined more by events than by programs and few periods have been more full of unexpected events like the one Europe has recently experienced. Reacting to the circumstances, UvdL acted politically and the results were not lacking.

More or less Europe?

There are some themes that dominated the campaign, perfectly consistent with national debates, but which now risk constituting a trap for those who have to decide. Based on the fact that the next Commission, starting from its summit, will have to obtain the consent of the absolute majority of the EP, there are those who argue that its appointment will once again have to reflect a majority that wants "more Europe", i.e. the current one of Popular, Socialists, Liberals and Greens, with the exception of right-wing and left-wing sovereignists who want "less Europe". A majority which, at least looking at the numbers, was confirmed by the polls.

The trouble is that this clear contrast between "more or less Europe" does not correspond to what the European Union really is, how it works and what choices those responsible will be faced with after the elections. In fact, there are several errors of perception in the collective imagination regarding the EU. In the European reality, progress towards more or less Europe occurs case by case in the solution of concrete problems. From this perspective, the terms "more or less Europe" take on considerable ambiguity and are often used inappropriately. Propose more or less gradualism in the implementation of the green deal, or fighting for more or less openness in matters of immigration, does not mean wanting "more or less Europe". In some cases, however, progress towards "more Europe" is mainly hindered by disagreements between traditionally pro-European governments and those convinced of being so. This is the case ofincrease in the EU budget or the issuance of common debt. However, there are limits that can make the position of left-wing or right-wing sovereignists incompatible with EU membership. An example is that of those who ask to limit immigration by closing the internal borders of the EU. More generally, it concerns the principle of the supremacy of European law and the consequent role of the Court of Justice and respect for the fundamental rules of the rule of law. These are existential and non-negotiable questions which, as we saw with regard to the first during the path that led to Brexit, can only be resolved with exit from the EU. Interestingly, all these red lines are present in the program Marine Le Pen. Tuttavia, Brexit seems to have transformed the EU into a new version of Hotel California, the Eagles song. Not even the most ardent sovereignists talk about leaving anymore; they are therefore condemned to reconcile their rhetoric with reality. This doesn't bother them too much when they are in opposition but, as Meloni seems to have understood, it is more complicated when they are in government. According to Mario Cuomo's famous formula, "we campaign in poetry, but we govern in prose".

The trap of majorities

Equally misleading is another aspect of the narrative that accompanied the electoral campaign: that which concerns majorities. The question is particularly insidious because it affects the instinctive perception we have of how the relationship between the executive and parliamentary majorities works in our representative democracies. The European institutions reflect a different model, although no less democratic for this reason. They are subjected to a double bind of legitimacy: through the governments and which expresses itself in the Council, through the electoral body and which expresses itself in the EP. The appointment of the Commission is the moment in which these two legitimacies meet and must be reconciled. Added to this is an additional difficulty: even if the EP is made up of parliamentary groups that can be traced back to "European parties", they are for a whole series of historical and cultural reasons much weaker and less disciplined than the parties we know at national level. . The “traditionally dominant coalition” I mentioned at the beginning has never been a true governing majority. There is none in Brussels or Strasbourg “coalition pact” which binds it together with the Commission to a specific programme. There is only one necessary investiture vote which takes place on the basis of the programmatic declarations of the President designated by the European Council, but subsequently many legislative measures will be voted on with variable majorities. Finally, even if the EP will have to vote on the final investiture, the Commission as a whole will by definition be made up of members who will reflect the government majorities of the individual countries and will not necessarily reflect the parliamentary majority called to vote for it. It is consequently illusory to expect to reproduce in Strasbourg the majorities that govern individual countries. Instead, there is a contradiction between two logics: the increasingly polarized national one, and the European one which rebels against claims to cage it in the left-right opposition.

The future of the sovereignists

In the background of all this there is obviously the question of the future of the galaxy populist and sovereignist. It is linked first of all to the profound differences that divide them; parties that often have contradictory priorities apart from declaring they want "less Europe". First of all, the attitude towards Russia and the war in Ukraine. In all cases, their true nature is only revealed when they somehow manage to participate in government. However, it is a mistake to believe that, to borrow Cuomo's metaphor, prose will prevail in any case when tested by reality. In the case of Giorgia Meloni the gap between poetry and prose on Europe is particularly important, but only because she seems convinced that Italian national interest requires not to come into open conflict with the dominant political consensus in Europe. This was not the case with the Polish Pis, Meloni's ally in the EP, which often remained conflictual and on the margins of EU politics for the entire duration of its government mandate. After all, sovereignists never lead the dances, but react to the dominant music. Even the pragmatism of governments like the Italian one largely depends on the solidity of the consensus on the part of the more traditionally pro-European governments, especially the French and German ones. The question that arises spontaneously to the foreign observer is therefore: What would be the "prose" of an RN-led government in France? Unfortunately, everything suggests that it is difficult to expect a replication of Meloni's pragmatism or even the relative harmony that characterized periods of cohabitation with Mitterrand and Chirac. At least initially and even if held back by the constitutional powers that remain in Macron's hands, an RN-led government could push France dangerously to the edge of an existential crisis with the EU. The inevitable consequences would be even more serious for the country than those produced by Brexit for the United Kingdom. However, the soaring explosion of French sovereignism may take time, as was the case with the British Conservatives. Speculating on the outcome is useless but the EU would experience the most serious crisis since its creation. At that point, what would Meloni's reaction be to the French change: would it give in to the call of ideology, or would it remain anchored to the national interest? His choice could be decisive for the future of European construction. In these conditions and regardless of the French unknown, what can we expect for the most imminent decisions? The changes that have occurred at a European level, but above all in some countries, will have a certain effect on some important choices that the EU will have to make. Firstly, the future of the green deal and the management of immigration. At least until the French elections, the support for Ukraine it should not be questioned; but a big question mark hovers over the aftermath.

So what will happen?

The immediate deadline, however, is that of the renewal of the heads of the institutions. For the moment, we are witnessing two irreconcilable narratives that reflect the misperception of the nature of European institutions that I spoke about earlier. Meloni tells us: I don't want to govern with socialists. Others say: I don't accept a majority that includes Meloni. The French earthquake does not allow for prevarication. Meloni and his ideological opponents will find themselves in the same European Council; a place where membership of various political families matters much less than what governments deem the national interest to be. All it takes is a little common sense to see that Meloni does not want to isolate himself from the appointment of the next Commission summit which will inevitably be decided with the help of socialist-led governments. On the other hand, given the Italian result, it will be very difficult and certainly counterproductive for the others to seek a conflict on this issue with the government of the third largest economy in the EU, which also emerged stronger from the elections. Then it will be time for the EP. In that context it would not make much sense for the Italian parliamentarians representing FdI not to vote for the candidacy proposed with the help of their leader. Likewise, it would not make sense for parliamentarians representing the traditionally dominant political forces to refuse a priori to share the vote with Meloni's party.

It remains to be seen whether the beneficiary of this scenario will be UvdL or someone else. The preceding analysis should lead us to conclude that there are no reasons that prevent his reconfirmation. However, it is possible that the controversies of recent weeks have weakened its image to the point of spreading the belief that it is necessary to change sides. Politics sometimes works like this. The possible weakness of UvdL does not depend on its merits or its errors, but on the fact that it does not have its own political base and is therefore in some way "spendable". At this point, however, it arises the question of the alternative, which is theoretically of two types. Taking into account the existing balances and the political priorities of the EU including the new centrality of security, it is reasonable to think that the chosen person should come from a country that is part of the euro and preferably also of NATO, but also that belongs to the family of the EPP. Some names are circulating in this regard, such as the Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriacos Mitzotakis, or the current Maltese President of the EP Roberta Metzola. These are high quality personalities, but who have the characteristic of coming from rather marginal countries in geographical, economic and political terms. The second option would consist of a totally unconventional choice, so the name we are talking about would be that of Mario Draghi. This is a personality whose competence, authority and ability cannot be denied. However, it is a hypothesis that faces some important difficulties. Ultimately, it seems that his candidacy could only take shape in the event of a prolonged stalemate not only on the name of UvdL, but also on the other possible alternatives.

In the end, do we want a strong Commission or not?

However, if we ignore this rather theoretical hypothesis for the moment, the most obvious meaning of a possible refusal of UvdL's reconfirmation is that of the choice of a Commission that is weaker than the current one and therefore less inclined to interfere with the prerogatives of governments. It would be an almost physiological reaction after the mandate of a strong and therefore controversial Commission. It also happened when it was decided to appoint Santer after Delors. In the life of the EU, these are commuting movements that can be managed without too many difficulties when the economic and geopolitical context allows it, but above all when the weakness of the Commission can be compensated for by the strength and cohesion of the main national governments. After all, that was how it was when Delors' mandate ended; France, Germany, but also others had fairly strong and stable governments. Today some governments emerge weakened by the electoral result, the situation in the two main countries is particularly fragile, less cohesive and there are no other actors who can compensate for these weaknesses. A strong and authoritative Commission would therefore be of great use. It is good for those who fill their mouths with "more Europe" in public speeches to keep this in mind. In particular, the French earthquake should push for a quick solution. One prolonged stall on the appointment of the heads of the institutions, especially in the case of a Le Pen victory in France, could have truly devastating consequences.

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